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This study is intended to give a survey on reconstruction, 
not as it affected the South, economically, politically or socially, 
but as it developed and expanded in Congress. The Radical program 
on reconstruction has been traced from the first recommendations 
of Stevens in December, 1865* down to its culmination in the Re­
construction Act of March 2, 1867. Auxilliary phases of the Radi­
cal program, such as the Freedmen* s Bureau, have been touched upon 
only in so far as they influenced, or had direct effect upon, Con­
gressional reconstruction.
A study of the debates was made, to see on what grounds, and 
by what means, the Radicals were able to promote such a plan as 
the Act of 1867. The debates are not satisfactory as a source of 
information. The decision on the bill was not reached by the argu­
ments. The debates were based on emotion and passion, were lack­
ing in substance, and showed little evidence of thought or judg­
ment. In fact, the question was not one of debate, but of propa­
ganda. The second problem then was to sift out the propaganda, 
and discover just what its effect had been on Congress, and on 
the speakers there.
There are no satisfactory accounts of the debate. Blaine, in 
his "Twenty Years in Congress," is the best. He discusses the 
subject, but his treatment is necessarily unsatisfactory, because 
of his Radical prejudice, and his desire to justify his party.
Miller, editor of "Great Debates in American History," devotes a 
good deal of space to reconstruction, but he appears to have
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derived his outline from Blaine, and padded it with quotations 
suggested by him. Because of this, the discussion suffers from the 
same faults as the earlier work. Neither of these writers gives 
any attention to the background of propaganda, on which the debate 
was based, and without which it loses its full significance.
The study has been made interesting by the people who have 
taken leading parts. Such men as Sumner, Stewart, Shellabarger, 
and Conkling could never be uninteresting. Thaddeus Stevens put 
fire into everything he touched, and he was the prime mover of the 
party. President Johnson, an unusually picturesque figure, was 
always in the background.
In order to understand the South of today, one must have an 
understanding of the reconstruction period. And to understand 
fully reconstruction in the South, it is necessary to make a care­
ful study of its development in Congress.
CHAPTER I
CONSOLIDATION OF RADICAL STRENGTH
1.
CHAPTER I.
CONSOLIDATION OF RADICAL STRENGTH 
Joint Cor^ittee.
President Lincoln had begun, and President Johnson had 
continued, the organization of loyal civil governments in the 
southern states. By December, 1865, when the thirty-ninth 
Congress met, these governments were functioning, and reconstruc­
tion was almost complete. Most of the members of Congress were 
pledged to support the Executive plan of reconstruction, with its 
three principles of ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
repudiation of war debts, and declaration that the secession 
ordinances were null and void. And not only by Congress, but by 
the North in general was this policy accepted.
But there were indications of approaching trouble— "the
1rumbling of Congressional ambitions," "How to steer clear of the
parties and personal contentions of Congress is now my chief re-
2sponslbllity," wrote Seward in November. But even he did not 
dream of the full significance of the rumblings, for he thought 
that the first of the year would see "the clearing up shower of 
faction."-^
In December, 1865, there were in Congress about twenty- 
five extremists, in both houses, who opposed the President's plan* 
Among them v/ere several very able men— clever political manip­
ulators, accomplished speakers, experienced and wily politicians* 
The most influential was Thaddeus Stevens.^ He had always been 
known as an advocate of extreme measures. In the thirties he
2.
had been a vigorous Anti-Mason. When the slavery issue rose he 
found a real scope for his talents. He had opposed the pro­
slavery measures of the Compromise of 1850. He had ?mnted war, 
in 1861, because he believed that it would inevitably result in 
the fall of slavery. He had been one of the first to demand 
emancipation, and the arming of the negroes. He had supported 
Lincoln in I864. because of emancipation. His attitude on recon­
struction was original. He had originated the "conquered prov­
ince theory" on the status of the South; he desired a territorial 
government for the conquered South; he demanded universal and 
impartial male suffrage in the South, providing always that the
hated rebels were excluded. He would provide for the negroes by
5a scheme of wholesale confiscation of rebel property.
Hardly less important than Stevens were several others. 
Williams, Howard and Morrill in the Senate, and Washburn and 
Shellabarger in the House held the same views, and were his de­
voted and able co-workers. Conkling and Boutwell contributed 
materially to the program.
These men were all ambitious; a few of them were motivated 
also by genuine convictions. They all opposed Johnson, and 
Executive reconstruction. There were several reasons for this 
opposition. Party considerations were foremost. If the 
Southern representatives should be admitted to Congress in the 
near future, it would be possible for them to unite with the 
Democrats, North and South, and so control Congressional pol­
icies. Negroes in the South might help to swing some Republican 
elections, but they had no vote. It was imperative, either that 
the negroes be given the vote, and so insure some Republicans
3.
from the South, or that the negroes he excluded from the basis of 
representation so that the dangerous number of Southern represent­
atives would be cut down* In addition to this, there was a very 
prevalent feeling that Congress had lost ground during the late 
war, and that it was high time its power should be reasserted.
Many of the members also felt a genuine hatred of the South.
This motive was especially strong with Stevens, who had never for­
given the Confederates for destroying his iron works at Chambers- 
burg.^
These leaders then, when Congress opened, had four chief 
objectives on v/hich to concentrate their efforts.
1. It was Imperative that they secure a delay on the progress 
of Johnson’s plan of reconstruction, so as to give them 
time to perfect their own plans and machinery.
2. They must prevent the entry of southern representatives 
Into Congress*
3. They must Influence public opinion, both in Congress and 
throughout the country, in such a way as to Increase 
their faction. In Congress they must have enough to 
make a majority.
4. It would facilitate matters if they could force an open
break between Congress and the President.
With this program before them, these members assembled in 
Washington in early December. Stevens tried, for the last time, 
to force his views on Johnson, but he failed. On December 1 
these men held a caucus, to concentrate and organize their 
strength. Hereafter they were known as the Radical faction of 
the Republican party. The first thing to be done was to prevent 
the Senate from admitting southern representatives. If this 
could not be done, then Stevens' program in the House would be 
useless. The caucus decided that the problem could be solved by
-4*
securing a Joint Committee, to which would bo referred all matters 
of reconstruction.
The regular Republican caucus met the next day. Fortunately
for the Radicals, Morrill, a Radical from Vermont, was chairman.
He appointed a committee to decide what to do about the southern
representatives, and, according to schedule, Stevens was a member
of the committee. Stevens presented his ready-prepared plan for a
Joint Committee, and the resolution seemed so innocent that the
Conservatives were completely deceived. Even Raymond, the ablest
of Johnson*s friends, failed to see its significance. The same
committee, dominated by Stevens, quietly directed the Clerk of the
House, McPherson, to leave off the roll the names of every person
7who claimed to represent any one of the eleven seceded states.
On December when Congress met for the first time, the 
Clerk of the House, when he called the roll, obediently omitted 
the names of all Southerners. Protests were unavailing. When 
Brooks demanded to know why the names were omitted, McPherson 
attempted to explain, but Stevens hastily interrupted. "We all 
know,” he interposed. McPherson took the hint, and evaded later 
questions. The election of officers was forced through with no 
opportunity for nominations. Wilson, of Iowa, presented a ticket 
of candidates, with a resolution that they be all elected. Objec­
tions were evaded by parliamentary technicalities and the whole 
ticket was elected, by a strict party vote. (133 yeas, 35 nays, 
all Democrats.) Truly this was "revolutionary.n Schuyler Colfax, 
of Radical sympathies, was the Speaker. His speech of acceptance 
was an impassioned bit of Radical propaganda.
Thon Stevens rose to present his Resolution. He wished to
5establish a joint Committee, of fifteen members, nine from the 
Rouse, and six from the Senate,
"to inquire into the condition of the States which 
formed the so-called Confederate States of America, 
and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled 
to be represented in either House of Congress, with 
leave to report at any time, by bill or otherwise; 
and until such report shall have been made, and 
finally acted on by Congress, no member shall be 
received into either House from any of the so-called 
Confederate States; and all papers relating to the 
representation of said States shall be referred to 
the said Committee without debate. " 10
This was a joint resolution, and so required the Presidents 
signature. A concurrent resolution would not require this, but 
Stevens wanted to force the issue with the President. If Johnson 
refused to sign the resolution, he at once made a break with 
Congress. If he accepted it he virtually abandoned his own plans 
of reconstruction.
The vote here was exactly like the vote on the election of 
officers. All the Union party supported the resolution, and thus 
voted against Johnson. All the thirty-five Democrats opposed the 
resolution. 11
The Senate was more cautious. The resolution was postponed
12twice, and was accepted on December 11, only after amendment.
The Senate resolution was concurrent, and so did not require the 
Presidents signature; the Senate refused to pledge itself to admit 
no Southern members until the committee reported. 1-3 December 14 
the House accepted the amended Senate resolution, but Stevens ad­
vanced a new resolution which included that part of the original 
plan which had now been omitted, and this passed.1"^
This success was the first Radical victory. By it they 
secured the first two of their desired objectives— delay, and the
6exclusion of Southern members from Congress* In the House they
had succeeded in inveigling all of the Republicans, even Johnson*s
friends and supporters to accept their plan* As Gideon Welles
wrote, "The new members, and others weak in their understandings,
were taken off their legs, as was designed, before they were aware
of it. " 1'5 True, it was an unwitting betrayal, on the part of
Johnson*s friends, but nevertheless important, as it gave the
Radicals an advantage* Johnson was aware of their gain, and spoke
16of the organization of the Committee as political intrigue.’ in 
the Senate the program was not quite so successful. There, only 
about half the Onion party accepted it* But the Senate*s action 
shows they were not wholehearted in their support of Johnson, or 
they would have refused the resolution in any form* Yet they were 
not wholly in sympathy with the Radicals, either, since they 
modified the most objectionable features of the resolution. These 
Conservatives in the Senate and the House were in a very Important 
position. They held the balance of power between the Democrats 
and the Radicals. The stake for which Stevens worked was the 
possession of these ten or twelve men. Johnson did not sense 
their significance, made no efforts to secure their support, and 
so in the end he lost them.
Of the fifteen members of the Joint Committee, nine were 
Radicals, three were Conservatives, and three were Democrats. The 
Senate sent three Radicals— Williams of Oregon, Howard of Michigan, 
and Harrlss of New York; two Conservatives— Fessenden of Maine, 
and Grimes of Iowa; and one Democrat— Reverdy Johnson of Maryland. 
The House members were six Radicals— Stevens of Pennsylvania,
7Conkling of New York, Boutwell of Massachusetts, Morrill of 
Vermont, Washburn of Illinois, and Blow of Missouri; one Conserv­
ative— Bingham of Ohio; and two Democrats— Grider of Kentucky and 
Rogers of New York.
Of the nine Radicals, Stevens, Conkling, Boutwell and
Williams were the most important and active. Blow soon came under
the Influence of Bingham and was lost to the Radicals. All three
of the Conservatives were active, Fessenden perhaps most so.
Welles says that Grimes controlled Fessenden but if so he remained
17in the background. Reverdy Johnson was the only important 
Democrat.
The Radical plan suffered one small setback. Fessenden, a
Conservative, was named chairman of the Senate group, by that body,
18and thus automatically became chairman of the Joint Committee."
It would have been more satisfactory if a Radical had been chair­
man, but this was not so serious an inconvenience as might have 
been expected.
Early Work o£ j&£ £&&£
On January 6, 1866, when the committee met for the first 
time, at Stevens1 instigation a sub-committee was appointed, to 
wait upon the President, asking him to take no further action with 
regard to Reconstruction, in order ”to avoid all possible colli­
sion or misconstruction between the Executive and Congress, in
regard to the relative position of Congress and the President.” 
Johnson handled the matter very skillfully, and announced that,
19
Is.
while he "considered it desirable that this natter of reconstruc­
tion should be advanced as rapidly as night be consistent with 
public interest, still he desired to secure harmony of action
between Congress and the Executive, and it was not his intention
20to do more than had been done, for the present,"
The first bill which the committee framed had to do with
representation. The uestion involved here was of peculiar
importance to the Radicals, since it concerned the number of
southern representatives. In I860, by the three-fifths compromise,
the South had eighteen men in Congress representing negroes.
After the war, if all the negroes were counted, the South would get
21twelve more— thirty in all. Since no negroes voted it was certain
that none of these thirty representatives would be Republicans.
Most of the Republicans in Congress v/ere bothered by this problem,
and there had already been a good bit of discussion of it. Early
in December, Stevens had proposed that the Constitution be amended
so that representation would be apportioned among the states
22according to the number of voters. Conkling was loud in support
23of the measure, but Blaine opposed it vigorously. His chief 
argument was that such a method of apportionment would be unfair, 
since New England had fewer voters in proportion to her population 
than other sections of the country.2^ This was due to the educa­
tional qualifications and the preponderance of women. Other New 
Englanders supported Blaine, and Stevens quietly withdrew his 
proposition.
When the Joint Committee caiae to consider the question it 
adopted a plan of Blaine*s which v/as acceptable to New England. 
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
9.
several States which may be included within this Union, according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
Ln each State, excluding Indians not taxed; provided that when­
ever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any 
state on account of race or color, all persons of such race or 
jolor shall be excluded from the basis of representation." *
Chi3 was agreed to in the Joint Committee with only one dissenting 
irate, that of Rogers. Reverdy Johnson was absent. The bill was 
manifestly unfair. It affected only the South, since it was only 
there that negroes were numerous enough to affect representation. 
"No northern state will lose by it; even New York, with her great 
population has so few blacks that she could exclude them all from
snumeration, and it would make no difference in her ropresenta- 
27tion." Too, if any one state in the South denied the franchise 
to negroes, all the negroes everywhere ln the Soxith were to be 
sxcluded. This might mean injustice to ten 3tates, because of the 
action of the eleventh. There was the additional point that only 
six states in the North gave negro suffrage at that time. A 
single Northern state could deprive all the South, without affect- 
Lng her own r ’presentation, or that of other Northern states.
On January 21, Stevens reported the resolution to the House, 
le desired that it be passed at once, so as to be sent to the 
state legislatures in time for them to act on it before adjourn­
ment. He thought two hours debate ought to be sufficient, but
the debate continued intermittently for a week, when the bill was
28sent back to the Committee. On Stevens1 suggestion, the Com­
al ttee struck out the words "and direct taxes," and returned It to 
the House, which passed it the same day.2^ In the Senate,
10,
Sumner’s opposition prevailed, and the Resolution failed.*
The question had not provoked any brilliant debate* Ike
supporters of the amendment harped on the question "Shall one
white man have as much share in the government as three other
white men, merely because he lives where blacks outnumber whites
two to one?”' Stevens, Fessenden, and Conkling all brought this
’'unfairness” out, and it was the chief argument used in support of 
32the bill. Opposition arguments were somewhat better. They main­
tained that the right to representation does not necessarily in-
•aigvolve the right to vote." They pointed out that the principle 
"no taxation without representation "was violated by the W U » ^ *  
They asked way, since the North was so concerned about the right 
of the negro to vote, the North did not grant her own negroes the 
suffrage, and if the theory of human rights was so much involved 
in suffrage, why not grant the franchise to women?-^ And if fair­
ness was so important to the Republicans, why did they not do
something about the senate, where New England1s twelve members 
36dominated?~
The question of civil and political rights for the negro
loomed almost as large as that of representation. The Black Codes
of the South precipitated the discussion. The Radical press
demanded a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing to the negro
37equal rights with the white. Discussion was general. On Decem­
ber 4, 1865, Sumner presented his famous resolutions, sections of 
which demanded ncomplete enfranchisement of all citizens, and 
• • . no denial of rights on account of color,"2® Two days later 
Farnsworth presented a series of resolutions very extreme in tone, 
in which he advocated equal franchise and civil rights for negroes.
n .
He believed that to admit traitorous whites, and exclude loyal
3dblacks, would be nmercy without justice— a crime#" The Com­
mittee took up this problem as soon as that of representation was 
considered. There was much disagreement within the committee, but 
finally they agreed on the following resolution:
"The Congress shall have power to make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper to se­
cure to the citizens of each state all privi­
leges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states; # . . and to all persons in the several 
states equal protection in the rights of life, 
liberty and property#1"*0
The vote in committee on this resolution stood 7 to 6# Three 
Kadicals, ktevens, Conkling and Harris, opposed it.^ Qn Feb­
ruary 13, Bingham reported the resolution to the House, which re­
ceived it without enthusiasm.^ It was recommitted to the Com­
mittee, again reported, deferred, and never heard from again until 
it appeared as Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment
fervid the Join! .gflnffi&tltefi i M  nqfliSajg.
January 6, 1866, the Joint Committee appointed four sub­
committees "to examine and report upon the present condition of 
the states composing the late so-called Confederate States of 
America."^ One of these sub-committees was concerned with only 
one state, Tennessee.
There had been much discussion and argument in Congress over 
the advisability of admitting Tennessee* It was generally con­
ceded that the state needed no reconstruction, and was probably 
entitled to admission, but Congress hesitated to accept her
representatives, for fear of establishing a precedent which might 
prove inconvenient later. Nevertheless, there was a fairly 3trong 
£.nd general sentiment favoring Tennessee.
There was some reason for this special favor. In East Ten­
nessee there had been forty thousand votes cast against secession. 
!1iose loyal men had supported the Union all through the war, and 
aiany of them had served in the Northern aray,^ In 'larch of 1862, 
President Lincoln had appointed Andrew Johnson as military governor, 
he had been very popular and successful. In January, 1865, a 
Constitutional Convention created a new state government which was 
acceptable. The new Constitution, ratified February 22, declared 
ihe secession laws null and void, as well as other acts of the 
Confederacy, and repudiated the Confederate debts. The state laws 
were gratifying also* Rebels were excluded from the franchise for 
.'ifteen years, A strict oath was prescribed. Discharged Union 
;soldiers were permitted to carry side-arms. Citizens were released 
:’rom paying state and county taxes for the years of 1862, 1863,
:.86A* A reward of $5,000 was offered for the apprehension of 
:shan G, Harris, governor of the state in 1861, because he "did 
use his position as governor to put the state in rebellion."^
The sub-committee on Tennessee consisted of two Conservatives, 
Jrimes and Bingham, and one Democrat, Grider.^ They secured
records of the Constitutional Convention, acts of the State legis­
lature, received petitions and examined witnesses* The witnesses 
mre all questioned in Washington, Only ten persons were called,
111 the members of the Tennessee delegation to Congress were 
examined, and they all testified that the position of the loyalists 
In Tennessee would be greatly strengthened if they were represented
12.
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in Congress. This opinion was stressed by all the witnesses. Hie 
Questions asked were stock Questions, and the answers were satis­
factory* animosity was chiefly personal. Public sentiment was
loyfxl to the federal government. The condition of the negro was
/ogood* The Freedman*s bureau was working to great advantage.
February 15 the sub-committee reported that Tennessee had
presented a constitution which was Republican in its form of
government, and that the state was entitled "to be one of the
United States of America, on an equal footing with the other states
50In all respects whatever." The resolution to this affect was
amended, reamended, and finally rejected. On the motion of
Williams, the whole subject of Tennessee was referred to a new
sub-committee* The vote on this suggestion accepted it, 8 yea to 
517 nay. It is important as it marks a realignment of sympathies 
within the Committee. Harris and Blow deserted the Radical fold, 
and supported the Conservatives. After this time Harris wavers 
between the two, but Blow became positively Conservative, and an 
ardent supporter of Bingham. Fessenden*s vote was of great sig­
nificance. He supported the new sub-camraittee, and thus placed 
himself for the first time with the Radicals. If he had refused 
his vote here the new sub-committee would have failed to material­
ize, and the report of the first one would have been accepted by 
the Committee. Sentiment in Congress was growing so favorable 
that it seems very probable that Tennessee would have been admit­
ted without any difficulty. This the Radicals were anxious to 
prevent, if possible, and they hoped that the new sub-committee 
would be able to do so.
In the appointment of the members of this new sub-committee
_____ ,__ = _ _ .... U .
Fessenden shows his Radical leanings again, for he named Williams,
Conkling ana Boutwell, three of the most extreme . ;embers of the 
«2group* On the .morning of February 19, this sub-committee re­
ported a resolution that Tennessee be accepted upon certain condi­
tions? X. The fctate must repudiate its rebel debts; 2. It should 
"forever maintain in its constitution the provision . . . disavow­
ing the doctrines of secession;" 3. It must disfranchise all 
rebels."^ The Joint Committee took no action on the resolution 
that morning* It was supposed that the President was to take ac­
tion on the Freedman1 s Bureau Bill that day, and. the Radicals, 
seeing an advantage if he returned a veto, wished to postpone the 
decision.
The first three weeks of February were critical ones for the 
Radicals. Barly in the session they had been very successful in 
their efforts. They had been able to put across their program of 
delay on Reconstruction, when they got the Joint Committee ac­
cepted by Congress. The same Committee assured them that the 
Southern representatives would not be accepted. They had been 
making some progress with their propaganda program, and public 
opinion was beginning to show its influence* In February they 
succeeded in swinging the Committee to a definite stand in opposi­
tion to Johnsonian Reconstruction, when they so skillfully 
engineered the Tennessee affair. But they were not yet sure of 
the House, and they were far from .sure of the Senate, By a series
15.
of fortunate accidents, clever manoevering, and bold strokes, the 
Radicals, under Stevens’ capable leadership, were able, within the 
next two months, to gain both the House and the Senate.
As has been said, Johnson had suspected the Radicals from the
first. He had believed that the Joint Committee was a political
54-weapon leveled at him and his Reconstruction policy. Any hopes 
he might have had from the Southern representatives were gone when 
Congress refused to admit them. Even the most loyal of States had 
been refused* Tennessee was his o n  state, and It would have meant 
a great deal to him to have her accepted. He had hoped that May­
nard, in ardent loyalist, would be able to make same gains for 
him, but Maynard was left with the rest of the representatives 
from the South. However, Idles was right when he said that 
Maynard and the Radicals hand and glove, and Johnson would not
cchave gained even if Tennessee had been admitted* And perhaps 
Vielles was right, for certainly Maynard was Radical later.
Yet Johnson’s position was far from hopeless. There were 
enough Conservatives in Congress to hold the balance of power 
between the Democrats and the Radicals. If Johnson had been more 
of a politician, or if he had had a clever politician to advise 
him, he might have compromised, and conciliated these few men. The 
Conservative leaders were not anxious to come to an open break with 
the President. But they would not accept his policy unless they 
could guide its working out, and this Johnson would not have per- 
mitted. Since no effort was made by the Executive to secure 
them, they gradually drifted toward the Radicals.
Of course the Radicals seized their opportunity, and re­
doubled their efforts to secure the favor of these Conservative
16
members. Yet there was still grave danger that they night come to 
some agreement with Johnson. This must be prevented, and Stevens 
embarked upon a deliberate policy of forcing a break between them 
and the President.
Almost at once a series of unfortunate events opened the way. 
On February 19, Johnson vetoed the Freedmenfs Bureau bill. In his 
veto message he attacked the bill as unconstitutional and ques­
tioned the right of Congress to legislate in such a way for those 
states which were without representation* nTho original bill was 
necessarily passed in the absence of the states chiefly to be 
affected, because their people were then contumaciously engaged in 
the rebellion. How the case is changed, and some at least of 
those states are . . « soliciting the allowance of the Constitu­
tional right of representation. At the time, however, of the 
consideration and the passing of this bill, there was no Senator
or Representative in Congress from the eleven states which are to
57be mainly affected by its provisions.”
Whan the Joint Committee met the next day, the order of 
business would normally have boon a decision on the report of the 
second sub-committee on Tennessee* But ttMr» Stevens said his 
opinion as to the expediency and propriety of this action . . . 
had been materially changed since yesterday. The first duty of 
the committee was to declare the power of Congress over this sub-
eftject of reconstruction.”  ^ He accordingly presented a resolution, 
on ■;hich he asked immediate action. "In order to close agitation 
upon a question which seems likely to disturb the action of the 
government, as well as to quiet the uncertainty which is agitating 
the minds of the people of the eleven states which have been
17.
declared to be in insurrection, no senator or representative shall
be admitted Into either branch of Congress from any of said states,
until Congress shall have declared such state entitled to such
59representation." This became known as Stevens’ "Declaratory 
Resolution." The vote in the committee stood 10 yeas to U nays 
with Johnson absent. Bingham and his new follower Blow were the 
only Republicans to vote against it.^°
The next day Stevens presented the resolution in the House, 
and moved the previous question. The Democrats made valiant 
efforts to delay the vote, but after six hours they saw the hope­
lessness of it, and the division was called. The vote was 109
yeas, all Republicans* 40 nays, 8 of theca Republicans, with Hay-
61mond among the number. Before the vote was taken, twenty-three
Republicans had left the House, to avoid the responsibility of
voting. To catch these men, Stevens moved to reconsider the vote
the next day, "since several of our friends who are absent this
62evening were very anxious to vote." ' On February 21 the second 
vote was taken, and again the resolution passed.^ Stevens had 
now a definite commitment of the House.
Johnson himself just at this time made a mistake v/hich was 
of utmost use to Btevens in forcing the breach. On Washington’s 
birthday, the ^resident spoke from the white House terrace to a 
large audience which had come from a popular mass meeting. The 
speech was not as bad as it has been described. Most of it was 
devoted to a defense of his own policy, and was "earnest, honest, 
and strong* But some of it was in poor taste, and much that 
he said was ill-advised. For a few minutes Johnson lost his 
judgment completely, and replied to the calls and questions from
18.
the croud. He bandied jests about hi- trade as a tailor$ he spoke 
of Stevens, Sumner, and Wendell Phillips, by name, as traitors; 
he charged the Radicals with plotting to assaslnate him; he refused 
to speak of Forney, because he did not want to "waste ammunition 
on a dead duck." But the greatest mistake came in an allusion to 
the Joint Committee as a central directory, 1 a sort of dictatorial 
body which was deliberately scheming to keep the South out of the 
Union.^
The Radical press the next day made much of Johnson’s remarks 
and hinted that he "had. had too much bad liquor to make a good 
speech. The country was scandalized at such lack of dignity 
in the President. Congress was angry at the unjust criticism of 
the Joint Committee* Johnson had alienated many people, and that 
at a critical time? when he desperately needed new friends.
On February 2f, Fessenden presented Stevens’ resolution to 
the Senate. There was much more debate here- than in the House, 
and it was of a more penetrating nature. Johnson’s case was ably 
presented, but when the matter came to a vote on March 2, there 
were 29 yeas, and 18 nays.^ The open break between Johnson and 
the conservative members of Congress was complete. Both the House 
and the Senate were committed against the President’s policy, and 
his right to reconstruct the South.
liven yet Johnson’s position was not hopeless, nor was the
Radical position secure. Johnson had not taken action on the
Civil Rights bill. If he signed that, he could still gain enough
68conservative Senators to block the Radical program. It seemed
cpiite probable that he would sign. Trumbull, Stewart and Sherman
0  ^ , , , 69 All the members ofof the Senate, all understood that he would.
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his Cabinet, except Welles and Seward, advised that he should.
It was an anxious time for the Radicals. Stevens tried to 
goad Johnson into some indiscretion, by his usual method of an­
noyance and near-insult. On March 10, he made a most irritating 
speech, at an unimportant Saturday session from which most of 
Johnson*s friends were absent. He began by professing feelings of 
friendship and respect for Johnson. His praise was interrupted by 
Price, a Radical, who recalled Johnson*s references to Stevens In 
the Twenty-second of February speech, and asked, "When I hear a 
gentleman whom I suppose to be the Thaddeus Stevens referred to, 
speak in such terms in favor of the President, I wish to know 
whether he is the same gentleman?" This was greeted with laughter, 
which continued when Stevens answered,
"Does the gentleman suppose the speech to which 
he refers was a fact? . . .  Sir, that speech 
was one of the grandest hoaxes ever perpetrated.
I am glad to have the opportunity to exonerate 
the President from ever having made that speech.
(Renewed laughter.) It is a part of the cunning 
contrivance of the Copperhead party, who have 
been persecuting our President since the fourth 
of March last. Why, sir, taking advantage of an 
unfortunate incident which happened on that oc­
casion, (laughter) they have been constantly de­
nouncing him as addicted to low and degrading 
vices. To prove the truth of what I say about 
this hoax, I send to the Clerk*s desk to be 
read, a specimen of this system of slander, 
printed in the leading paper of the Democratic 
party."
The Clerk read from the New York World, of March 7, 1865, an 
editorial which deplored the fact that the Vice-Presidency was 
now filled by an "insolent drunken brute, In comparison with whom 
even Caligula*s horse was respectable." Stevens went on—
"Vife never credit this slander. But our enemies resort to another expedient. If ay friend be­
fore me (Bingham) were trying a case of
19.
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de lunatico inquirendo, and if the outside 
evidence were doubtful, he would lead the 
alleged lunatic to speak upon the subject 
of his hallucination, and if he could be 
induced to gabble nonsense, the intrinsic 
evidence of the case would make out the 
allegation of insanity* So, Mr. Speaker, 
if these slanderers can make the people be­
lieve that the President ever uttered that 
speech, then.they have made out their case.
(Laughter. ) 71
Perhaps such tactics had something to do with goading Johnson 
into changing his mind on the Civil Rights bill. At any rate, on 
March 27 he returned a veto.
Gaining ihe ££&£&£ & 2E Radicals.
Early in March the Radicals turned thoir serious attention to 
the situation in the Senate. So far, the session had showed the 
general conservative tendency of that body. Out of the fifty 
senators, there were only thirty on whom the Radicals could de­
pend. This was a safe majority, but it was four short of being 
the two-thirds necessary to override a veto. As the session pro­
gressed, and Johnson’s use of the veto came to be understood, it 
became increasingly necessary for the Radicals to gain the two- 
thirds majority. Without it, their program would be halted. Al­
ready Johnson’s veto had been able to kill the Freedmen’s Bureau 
bill. Speedy action was necessary if the Civil Rights bill was 
not to suffer the same fate.
For reasons never satisfactorily explained, Stewart of 
Nevada, Morgan of New York, and Willey of West Virginia, changed 
their politics in March. During the first part of the session,
21,
Stewart had been a staunch Administration Republican. He had 
influenced his friend Morgan to such an extent that Morgan also 
was a Johnson man. They both voted consistently with the Con­
servatives until the end of March, when Stewart suddenly changed 
on the Stocton affair, and Morgan followed him. For the rest of 
the session, with one exception, Stewart remained a dependable
party man. On April 4, 1866, he presented a plan of reconstruction,
72which was his last independent act.
Senator John P. Stocton, a Democrat from New Jersey, was the
fourth man selected by the Radicals as necessary to make their
two-thirds majority. But they tried a new method here. They
claimed to find a flaw in his credentials. It was customary in
New Jersey for the legislature to elect representatives by a
majority vote. Stocton had received a plurality, but the legls-
73lature, by a special resolution, had voted to accept him. When 
Stocton presented his credentials to the Senate they were accepted. 
Now, however, a question was raised, and the matter was referred 
to the Judiciary Committee.
In the early part of February Senator Wright, Stocton* s 
colleague, from New Jersey, had been taken ill. Before he went 
home he had made a pair with Morrill of Vermont. Both men sup­
posed that Wright would be ill only a short time, but he had not 
returned by March. Morrill was a Radical, and his party needed 
his vote in the coming contest over the ejection of Stocton. 
Accordingly, on Wednesday, March 21, Morrill, on Fessenden*s 
advice, sent Stocton a letter notifying him of his intention to 
break the pair. Stocton showed the note to Reverdy Johnson, and 
Johnson advised him not to notify right, but said that he himself
22,
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would see Morrill, The next morning, before the Senate was called 
to order, Johnson talked to Morrill* As a result of this inter­
view, Morrill gave Stocton permission to wire Wright* "Senator 
Morrill wishes you to know that after allowing you a reasonable
time to get to Washington, he will consider himself at liberty to
7 Lvote in my case.” This telegram was read, and approved by 
Morrill, and sent at once from the Senate chamber.
That same Thursday afternoon, the Judiciary Committee re­
ported* After a thorough investigation, the committee had come to 
believe that Stocton*s election was legal. There was only one 
dissenting member of the committee— Clark, a Radical. Trumbull
presented the report, together with a resolution to the effect that
75Stocton was entitled to his seat. This was vigorously opposed,
even Fessenden speaking against it. That day also, a petition
was received from certain Radical members of the New Jersey legis-
76lature, requesting that Stocton be ejected. Indeed, it was ad­
mitted openly in Congress that the New Jersey legislature, al­
though it had completed its session, was adjourning from day to
day, for no other purpose than to elect Stocton* s successor, as
77soon as Stocton should be removed.
On Friday morning Stocton received a protest from Wright. He
read it to Morrill, and Morrill said that he did not know what to 
78do. The vote came up that afternoon. If Wright had disobeyed 
his doctor*s orders, and risked his life to go to Yashlngton to 
be present for the vote, he would have had to leave his home on a 
midnight train Thursday. Even then he might have been too late. 
This was Morrill’s "reasonable time,” Dixon, another Conservative, 
was also absent, ill in Washington. He had arranged that, if
23.
necessary, he would be carried to the chamber on a stretcher, and 
so cast his vote for Stocton.
79The vote on Friday stood 21 to 20 In favor of Stocton*
Stocton had not voted; neither had Morrill. But just before the
vote was announced Sumner and Fessenden both called out, "Vote,
Mr* Morrill." He allowed his name to be called, and brought the
vote up, 21 to 21. Then Stocton demanded that his name be called.
For a moment the Radicals were too disconcerted to protest, and
before they made any move Stocton*s vote was recorded. He had
81kept his seat by a vote of 22 to 21.
Stocton supposed that the matter was closed. Wright made no
effort to leave his sick bed and go to Washington. But on Monday
Sumner unexpectedly moved to amend the Journal of the previous
82Friday, so as to strike out Stocton*s vote. This of course would 
cost him his seat. After an all day discussion, Sumner moved 
"that the vote of Mr. Stocton be not received in determining the 
question of his seat in the Senate."8^ This finally passed, with­
out a division.
Wright was notified of the new turn of affairs. Tuesday
morning, just preceding the revote, Stocton read a telegram from
him, in which he begged to have the case deferred until Thursday.
He would disobey his doctor, and promised to be present on that 
. 8Aday. The case had already been postponed once, from Monday the 
19th, to Wednesday the 21st, so that Clark, a Radical, might be 
in his place, 85 But it was no part of the Radical plans to delay 
now, and so give Stocton another vote. Wright’s plea for delay 
was refused, Morrill had made another pair, with Foster this 
time, and he was absent. Stewart, obeying orders, was absent
24.
........  ' ' “ .............'..........  ~ ' ..... ' ~  ' " ..~  ........also* Riddle of Delaware changed his vote for some mysterious
reason* When the results were announced It was discovered that
ct nStocton had lost his seat. The vote stood 23 to 20.
This disgraceful affair gave the Radicals their necessary two- 
thirds majority in the Senate* It Is also significant because it 
shows so clearly the organization and cohesion of the Radical party. 
"The Indecent, unfair, arbitrary conduct of the few master spirits
Mis most reprehensible,” wrote belies. Morrill was not essential­
ly dishonest, yet he broke his word at the bidding of the party. 
Stocton himself described the situation perfectly. •Morrill him­
self was very uneasy, and very doubtful, and very anxious to do 
right, and It was the pressure of his party friends that forced 
him to give that vote.” The party whip was to prove very useful 
to the Radicals.
The two-thirds majority was gained none too soon. While the
final vote was being called a message from the President was re-
90celved. It was the veto of the Civil Rights bill.
It had been a memorable four months. In December, some 
twenty-five or thirty Radicals had perfected their organization 
for the first time. They had decided on a policy of deliberate 
opposition to the President. They had accepted the leadership of 
Thaddeus Stevens, and under his guidance they had succeeded even 
beyond their utmost expectations. The first week of the session 
they had, at one stroke, secured the necessary delay on reconstruc­
tion matters, and prevented the entry of southern representatives
25.
Into Congress. By the middle of February they had gained the 
support of the Joint Committee} by the first of March they had 
swung the House to their side; by the end of March they had secured 
the Senate.
They had prepared their way, and now they were ready to begin 
constructive Radical legislation. Their first work was a plan of 
reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment.
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CHAPTER II.
THE FIRST PLAN OF CONGRESSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION.
Day after day the debate had brought out persistent demands 
for a Congressional plan of reconstruction. The first day of the 
session Stunner had presented his famous resolutions, setting forth 
certain guarantees which Congress should demand from the South.
1. ”An honest recognition of the unity of the Republic.”
2. "Complete enfranchisoment of all citizens; . . .  no 
denial of rights on account of color.”
3. Repudiation of the Confederate debt, and adoption of the 
Federal debt.
<4. Equal educational systems for all, without distinctions 
for race or color.1
Two days later Farnsworth of Illinois presented a series of
resolutions quite extreme in tone. He would amend the Constitution
so as to provide for equal civil rights, and franchise for ne- 
2groes.
On January 5, 1866, Rufus Spalding of Ohio presented another 
series of resolutions, which defined the early ideas of radical 
recons truetlon *
1. Qualified right of suffrage in the District of Columbia.
2, An amendment excluding negroes from representation, 
except in states whore they were granted the suffrage.
3* An amendment prohibiting nullification and secession,
4>* An amendment requiring the South to repudiate the 
Confederate debt, and to assume the Federal debt.
5. An amendment denying former rebels admission to Congress. 
Stevens formally opened the debate on reconstruction on 
December 18, 1865, when he expounded his ”eonquered province”
3
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theory.^ Much of the time for the next four months was spent In 
exhaustive discussions of the condition of the South under Johnson­
ian reconstruction. The Radicals organized their debate very 
cleverly, and bolstered their arguments with pseudo-proof. There 
was Carl Schurz* s report. There were letters and reports from 
officers of the Freedman*s bureau. Every Radical in the South, 
and they were legion, bombarded Congress with letters and lemo- 
rials. Before many weeks of the session were gone the Radicals 
had accumulated a very respectable quantity of "evidence.”
The debate brought out the general tenor of Congressional 
opinion. There were certain guarantees which almost all the 
Republicans, even the Conservatives, demanded. Four of these 
concern us here.
1. Equal civil rights for negroes.
2. Some plan of equable representation.
3. The exclusion of rebels from holding offices, or from
being admitted to Congress, 4
4. A repudiation of the Confederate debt, and a guarantee
of the national debt.
Most of the Radical propaganda centered around these four 
points. The most important "proof” which the Radicals had was the 
report of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, on conditions in the 
South. The four sub-committees, appointed in January, 1366, 
called, witnesses, and asked thorn stock questions, which were 
calculated to draw out the type of answers desired by the Radicals. 
As a result, the report seemed to indicate that there was great 
need for legislation on those four points.
There were a number of plans for Congressional reconstruction 
presented to Congress. These were referred to the Joint Committee,
32,
and most of them were never heard from again. Two of them, how­
ever, were important— one formulated by Senator Stewart, and one 
by Robert Dale Owen,
The S-SsssEfc Plan
On March 16, 1S66, Senator Stewart, of Nevada, proposed a 
plan of reconstruction which was unique among all those suggested. 
It considered the South as well as the Northt
1, Each southern state was to be recognized "as haring 
resumed its former relations with the government." 
Representatives were to be admitted to Congress when 
the state had amended its constitution so as to give 
negroes equal civil rights, to repudiate its war debts, 
to yield all claims for liberated slaves, and to grant 
the elective franchise to all persons on the same 
terras. Those persons who had been qualified to vote 
in 1860 were not to be disfranchised by any new tests 
or conditions,
2* When these conditions had been complied with, and 
ratified by a majority of the present voting popula­
tion, a general amnesty was to follow.
3. The loyal states were "respectfully requested to in­
corporate in their constitutions an amendment cor­
responding with the one above described,"
4, The bill was "not intended to assort a coercive power 
on the part of Congress in regard to the regulation 
of the suffrage in the different states, but only to
make an appeal to their own good sense and lGve of 
country, with a view to the prevention of serious 
evils now threatened,"4 *6
This plan was originally intended as a compromise, With 
it Stewart hoped to unite the President and all Republicans in a 
common plan of action. For a time there seemed to be some pros­
pects of success. The Radicals were not wholly in opposition to 
it, as they interpreted the bill to provide for universal suffrage.
Stewart and Henderson, in support of the bill said that Johnson
7favored its principles. Stewart, in a long speech in the Senate, 
said, "The proposition which 1 have presented in this resolution 
. . . has been endorsed by every leading Union newspaper throughout
athe North, except perhaps the New York Times." He cited a number 
of prominent people, both Northerners and Southerners, who favored
it 9
Vben Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights bill, all hopes of unit­
ing Congress and the President on a compromise measure vanished.
On April 4 Stewart presented his plan again, slightly modified.10 
It was not received enthusiastically, and a week later Stewart 
moved to amend it, so as to make it more acceptable to the Radi­
cals.11 On April 16 he appeared before the Joint Committee and 
addressed that group "at length, in support and advocacy of his 
resolution,1” But the bill was not seriously considered by the 
Committee; in fact they did not even discuss it again. Johnson, 
when he vetoed the Civil Rights bill, had so alienated Congress 
that any moderate plan of reconstruction was refused.
33,
The Robert Dale Owen Plan.
The next plan considered was one brought forward by Robert 
Dale Owen of Indiana, He had been intensely Interested in the 
Preedmen, since 1863 Mien he had. served as chairman of a govern­
ment commission inquiring into their condition. He had kept in 
close touch with the South, and had been greatly distressed by 
the failure of Congress and the Joint Committee to put forward some
24.
plan of reconstruction. In March, 1866, he became so "exercised" 
over the delay that he went to Washington, resolved to do what he 
could "toward the judicious settlement of so vital a question,"
He drafted a proposed amendment to the Constitution, secured 
the approval of Governor Morton, and then went to Stevens with his 
plan.
1. "?Jo discrimination shall be made by any State or by the 
United States, as to the civil ri&ts of persons, because 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
2. After July 4# 1876, "no discrimination shall be made by 
any State, or by the United States, as to the enjoyment 
by classes of persons, of the right of suffrage, because 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,”
3* Until July 4* 1876, no class of persons deprived of the 
suffrage shall be included in representation.
4* Rebel debts shall be repudiated.
This was accompanied by a resolution,
"Whenever the above recited amendment shall have 
become part of the Constitution, and any State lately 
in insurrection shall have ratified the same, and shall 
have modified its Constitution and lav/s in conformity 
with the first section thereof, then all laws . • . con­
fiscating the property of the inhabitants of such States, 
or imposing on any of them pains, penalties, or disabilities, 
because of their participation in the Rebellion, shall be 
deemed and held to be repealed, . . . and senators and 
representatives from such State shall be admitted, assuch.”U
Three classes of Southerners were excluded from office until 
after July 4, 1876. These included persons who were officers in 
the United States army or navy, or members of the Thirty-sixth 
Congress, or of the Cabinet in 1860, who had taken part in the 
rebellion.15
Owen urged the advantages of the bill. He held that the ne­
groes were wards of the government, but added, "We can not separate 
the interests of the negro from those of the planter. If we chafe
35
and sour the whites of the South* the blacks must necessarily 
suffer t h e r e b y I h e  negro was not yet ready for political rights. 
That was no fault of his own, but he must not be given political 
powers, which he would use unwisely. There must be time for educa­
tion. In the Meantime, the whites were to rule, and the blacks 
were to be protected by the government.^
Stevens was favorably impressed with the first part of Owen*s 
proposition. *1*11 be plain with you, Owen,” he said. "V/e’ve 
had nothing before us that comes anywhere near being as good as 
this, or as complete. It would be likely to pass, too. That’s 
the best of it. he haven’t a majority, either in our committee or 
in Congress, for immediate suffrage, and X don’t believe the 
States have yet advanced so far that they would be willing to 
ratify it. I’ll lay that amendment of yours before our committee 
tomorrow, if you say so, and 1*11 go my best to put it through,”^  
But to the resolution, he objected* "That will never dol Far too 
lenient.
Stevens did present the plan to the committee and he reported 
that "All the Republican members received the proposal more or 
less favorably. w ^ Fessenden, Washburn, Conkling and Howard, all 
approved it. Boutwell and Bingham accepted it with minor reserva­
tions. Outside the committee, Wilson "heartily approved it,” but 
Sumner could not accept it. He felt that to vote for it would be 
to "palter with the right” since it contained ”a tacit recognition
that the ex-slave holders have a right to withhold suffrage from
20the freodmen for ten years longer.”
otevens was as good as his word, and advocated the amendment 
in the committee.^ It was discussed, and on April 21 it was
voted on, section by section, and passed* One democrat, Reverdy
ooJohnson, supported it. On April 23, on Stevens’ motion, the
resolution was withdrawn, but the amendment was retained, and
23ordered reported* After the group had risen to depart some one 
suggested that it would be courteous to wait a few days until 
Fessenden, who was ill with the varioloid, should return* This 
proposal v/as agreed to, with far reaching results* In the interval 
between this meeting and the next, at which Fessenden was present, 
there were Republican caucuses held separately by the members of 
Congress from Rew York;, Illinois, and Indiana, "to consider vdiether 
equality of suffrage, present or prospective, ought to form a 
part of the Republican program for the coming canvass*”2^ "They 
were afraid, so some of them told me,” said Stevens, "that if 
there was ’a nigger in the wood pile’ at all, it would be used 
against them as an electioneering handle, and some of them— hang 
their cowardicel— might lose their elections. By inconsiderable 
majorities, each of these caucuses decided that negro suffrage, 
in any shape, ought to be excluded from the platform, and they 
communicated these decisions to us. Our committee hadn’t backbone 
enough to maintain its ground. Yesterday the vote on your plan was 
reconsidered, your amendment was laid on the table, and in the 
course of the next three hours we contrived to patch together—  
well, what you’ve read this morning . • . Damn the varioloial 
It changed the whole policy of the c o u n t r y . " W h a t  you read 
this morning*’ was the first draft of the Fourteenth Amendment.
_  36.
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I M  Fourteenth MsiteBt.
The plan of Congressional reconstruction finally adopted grew 
out of the Stewart resolution. In committee that plan was amended 
and reamended some twenty times, until it lost almost all traces 
of the original <» The resolution, as worked out by the committee,
provided*
1. "Ho State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.®
2. Whenever, in any State, the elective franchise shall be 
denied to any portion of its male citizens, the basis 
of representation in such State shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of male citizens shall bear
to the whole number of such male citizens.
3. Until July 4, 1870, all former rebels shall be excluded 
from the right to vote for representatives in Congress,
or for Presidential electors.
4. Neither the United States, nor any State shall assume
debts incurred in insurrection.2”
Section 1 was entirely new. Section 2 was substantially the 
old Representation Bill of January 20. Section 3 was na measure 
of whole-exclusion.” Section 4 was Owen*s, in substance.
The resolution shows that it was “patched together.” The 
wording is not accurate and concise; the marshalling of ideas is 
not logical and clear. It Is difficult to understand why such a 
piece of work should have been reported from the committee, or why 
tiie committee considered three hours* time enough to draft so 
important a resolution as an amendment to the Constitution, deal­
ing with a problem so tremendously difficult as reconstruction.
On April 30 the resolution was Introduced into the two Houses 
of Congress. Stevens presented the bill to the House, with a
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brief speech of explanation.^ Section 3 drew the fire of most of 
the members, Republicans as well as Democrats. It would be dif­
ficult, if not impossible, to enforce: it wa3 a breach of faith, 
to give the President power to pardon the rebels, and then dis­
franchise them: it was foolish to expect that a disfranchised 
outlaw would, on July 4> 1670, suddenly become a true and loyal 
citizen: it was simply a party measure, designed to postpone a 
restoration of the Union. Stevens defended it. "Give us the 
third section or give us nothing. . , When party is necessary to 
sustain the Union, I say rally to your party, and save the Union." 
But in spite of Stevens* efforts it was evident that the third 
section would be rejected. A blunder of the Democrats saved it. 
Several members of that party believed that, if this section were 
retained as a part of the amendment, the whole amendment would 
fail. Accordingly, about twelve Democrats voted with the Radicals, 
and the section was retained by a margin of only five votes. On 
Kay 10 the amendment wa3 passed as it had been reported.-^
In the Senate Fessenden reported the bill, and opened the 
debate, but nothing was done for a lew days. Several amendments 
and substitutes were offered, but it was not until the last part 
of May that the debate became serious. Stewart, on May 24, 
delivered what Kendrick calls "by far the most interesting and 
statesmanlike speech that was made on the general subject of re­
construction at any time during the session." ^ 1 His thesis was 
equal franchise, and a general amnesty, Clark of New Hampshire 
offered a substitute for section 3 defining those ineligible for
Dffice, and this substitute was eventually incorporated into the 
32amendment.^
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The bill was so strenuously and effectively opposed that the 
Radicals began to fear its defeat. "Defeat of a party program could 
not be borne; its effects would be disastrous. A caucus was called^ 
and we witnessed the astounding spectacle of the withdrawal for 
the time, of a great legislative measure touching the Constitution 
itself, from the Senate, that it might be decided in the secret 
councils of a party." After five days the caucus came to an 
agreement. To the first section was aaded a definition of citizen­
ship. Section 2 remained the same. Section 3 was discarded, and 
a new one drawn up, enumerating those classes of persons ineligible 
for office. To section 4 was added a clause declaring that the 
national debt was valid.
The matter came to a vote on June 8, and the amendment passed, 
33 to 11, with one Republican and four Democrats absent. Hie 
House concurred in the Senate*s changes, on June 13. ^
Mil-
At the same time that the Fourteenth Amendment was drawn up, 
the Joint Committee had formulated another bill, which was pre­
sented to Congress with the amendment.-^ This was known as the 
Restoration Bill, and provided that whenever the Fourteenth 
Amendment should have become part of the Constitution of the 
United States, and any state lately in insurrection should have 
ratified the amendment, and have modified its constitution and
laws in conformity with it, the Senators and Representatives from
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such state might be admitted into Congress.
After the bill was Introduced on April 30, there was desultory 
debate, in both houses, but nothing was done. After May 29, when 
the Senate caucus decided to change Section 3 of the amendment, 
the Senate tabled the bill. The House debated it f o r  three months, 
without taking any action. Finally, a motion was made to table 
it* A division showed 101 yeas, 35 nays, and 4-6 not voting. Both 
houses had failed to take action on the bill which was the "cap­
stone" of the whole matter of Congressional reconstruction. This - 
bill "Was a constituent part of the proposed plan of reconstruc­
tion, if that plan was to be reconstructive in anything more than 
& contingent sense.
The Radicals, however, must do something to show, at least by 
implication, that Congress had made n real plan of reconstruction. 
On July 19, word was received that Tennessee had ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment, By the end of the session both houses had 
admitted representatives from that state, and thus had given-the 
impression that the other southern states would be received in the 
same way, when they had ratified the amendment. Seward wrote, on 
July 23, "Congress . , .is really engaged, at last, in removing 
the embarrassments which surround the Tennessee question, and is 
preparing to admit that state. This once done will be the har­
binger of the final restoration of all* My solicitude about af­
fairs will . . .  be relieved when I see Tennessee restored*"^®
Many other people believed the same thing, which was just what the 
Radicals wanted them to believe.
40.
41.
M M ®  m  tiie  G S t t g s U Q B  £>f M £2ns t;ruc,U ofl.
On December 18, 1865# Stevens opened the debate on recon­
struction, by expounding his famous "conquered province" theory, 
or the >elation of the South to the Union. For four years the 
Confederate States had waged war with the Union, and had been 
acknowledged belligerents by the United States and foreign powers. 
This was supported by law. Justice Grier, in his decision on the 
Prize Cases, held that the southern states were belligerents, and 
that a state of belligerency might exist even when the two parties 
were not foreign nations. The argument that the South did not 
make war because the Constitution forbids it, was absurd. It was 
like saying that A did not kill B, because he could not have, since 
the law forbids murder. The war was waged by states, not individ­
uals. Individuals do not make war. The Southern Confederacy con­
sidered itself to be out of the Union. In view of all this, 
certainly the North was Justified in treating the South as a 
conquered belligerent.
Congress must determine the condition of the conquered states, 
and provide for their government. This government should be 
territorial in form, and the qualifications for voters should be 
fixed, so as to exclude all rebels, and include all loyal persons 
without regard to race or color. The South should remain In its 
territorial status until Congress had made any desired changes in 
the Constitution. Such changes should include a re-apportioning 
of representatives according to voters and not population, and
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and should give the Federal government authority to levy export 
duties such as would insure a proper tax on cotton. Of course 
these amendments would not be submitted to the southern states, 
since they would be simply territories. It should be solemnly 
decided whether Congress or the President had the power to rein­
state these provinces. By all rights, the power belonged to Con­
gress, and it was time that Congress should assert its sovreignty, 
and assume something of the dignity of a Roman Senate.^
After this date, two men led the debate, Raymond of New York 
for the Conservatives, and Shellabarger of Ohio for the Radicals. 
The speeches of these two men epitomize all the argument made on 
reconstruction, up to February, 1867. Other speakers of both
JLOparties simply fell into line, and worked over this material.
2 l  J M  ldJ& i M  Radical Rebuttal.
Conservative Constructive Argument. How did the South get out 
of the Union? The ordinances of secession simply declared an 
Intention to secede. The South failed to maintain its ground on 
that intention, and was defeated by force of arms.
Radical Rebuttal. The Southern states did not leave 
the Union by virtue of any ordinances of secession. They 
left it when they superceded and destroyed loyal govern­
ment in their states.
SfiBS-SKYatrAYg Constructive Argument. Stevens was wrong when he
Isaid that the states forfeited their existence by the fact of 
rebellion. Individuals in the states may have done so, but the 
states as states, did not. There is no law which can punish a 
state, as a state, for any act it may perform. Our Constitution 
can not, since it does not deal with states.
Radical Rebuttal. The Conservatives have made a
distinction where none exists, in stating that the people 
of a state may forfeit their rights, but that this does 
not effect the condition of their state in the Union,
This says that individually, treasonable persons have no 
political significance, but collectively, they can be 
called a state, and take their places in the Union! In 
the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court judged that individuals 
in the South "acted as states" in organizing the rebellion. 
Court decisions to this effect may be summarized.
1. The rebel states "acted as states" In organizing 
the rebellion.
2. All their citizens, innocent and guilty, were 
thereby made "enemies of the United States."
3» Even though they were "enemies," they were not 
"foreign states."
4. The United States may exercise over these people 
both belligerent and sovreign power, and there­
fore we may try Davis for treason, under our 
sovreign power.
5. By inference. The states became enemy territory, 
governed by enemies, and thus they can not have 
been having any political rights in this Union.
It mocks the law to say that those people or states 
have any right of government in the Union, when every 
man, woman and child residing in them have been declared, 
by two unanimous judgments of the Supreme Court, to be
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public enemies of the United States.
The Constitution does deal v/ith states. It imposes 
restraints and obligations upon them as states. It secures 
rights and confers powers upon them, as states. In fact, 
it has fifty or more important provisions which deal with 
the states as states.
Congress assumed that the rebel states had no rights 
as states, when the blockade was established, and when the 
revenue and tariff acts gave preference against the South.
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Conservative gfffla&EHfiUyg. Southern states can not
be said to have forfeited their existence. If there had been no 
Constitution of any sort in them, then they would have ceased to 
exist, but there never was a time when their organization as 
states was destroyed.
Radical Rebuttal, An organized rebellion can not be 
an organized nstate.n In those eleven districts there 
was no obedience to law, except the law which compelled 
the defiance of all "supreme lawsj" there was no govern­
ment except one which enforced disloyalty to govern- 
ments; there was no observance of the law of nations, 
unless that is to be found in remorseless assassination 
and murder.
CtenaqmttSfi hzsmmt- Since the states are
within the jurisdiction of the Constitution, they are really and
truly states of the Union, just as they were before the war.
Their practical relations to the Constitution have been disturbed, 
and our victory in the field has given us the means of restoring 
their relations to the government.
Hadleal Rebuttal. The combined forces of the Constitu­
tion, public law, the dictates of reason, justice and 
common sense, and repeated and unanimous decisions of the 
Supreme Court, have established that organized rebellions 
are not States, and have forfeited their powers and 
rights as states*
States have none of the rights or powers of states 
where they do not recognize their obligations and duties.
Johnson himself says that his power over reconstruc­
tion comes from his Constitutional duty to guarantee to 
every state in the Union a republican form of government. 
If the old governments have simply come back, then the 
states already have republican forms of government, and 
reconstruction is not necessary. In this the President 
holds our opinion, and we can not attack him. They attack 
the President who hold that the old state constitutions 
are still there in the South, for if that is true, then 
Johnson has violated them.
AlfflMW.afeS 2l i&S. Cqfl5,ervatly&§, No£ Refuted.
If we consider the South to have become a separate power, 
and to have been out of the Union, then we have accepted the
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doctrine of state sovreignty, since that was their justification, 
and the basis on which they committed their action.
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If the South is not still in the Union, but became effectively- 
separated from it, then we can not speak of loyalty there, any 
more than we can of treason. Loyalty to the Union was loyalty to 
a foreign nation, and treason to their own.
If the Confederacy was really independent, then it had the 
right to contract debts, and we, having taken the country over, 
have become heirs to those debts. Foreign countries have made 
claims for payment of debt on this theory, and the Secretary of 
State has denied them, on the ground that the Confederacy could 
not contract debts. Yet if it was independent, surely it could 
have done so.
of j&e Radicals. S M  Cff.aaBCYftfr&Y9 Rebuttal.
Ba&LfiaJ. j&flatogjyjcg itogaasat* Reconstruction is and ought to 
be a function of the legislative branch of the government. The 
Executive has overstepped his duty in undertaking to set up civil 
governments in the South. The Executive oan not exercise any 
civil function. Hence what he has done he has accomplished by 
means of a usurpation of power.
Rebuttal. The Constitution expressly
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gives to the President the duty to guarantee to every 
state in the Union a republican form of government. This 
is what his reconstruction policy will accomplish. He is 
also justified, because his work in the South is simply a 
continuation of his war duties, and falls under his power 
as commander-in-chief of the array and navy.
It was the duty of Congress, as it was of all the 
departments of the government, to attempt to prevent the 
South from seceding. The moment that this was accomplished, 
and the insurrection v/as over, Congress ceased to have any 
power over those states, except such as It has over any 
state.
Radical Constructive Argument. The southern states were surely 
out of the Union, and they possess none of the attributes which 
are necessary, under the Constitution, to readmit them to the 
Union. Therefore, they must remain either subject states or 
territories, until they are ready for readmission. To give them 
the status of territories is the most generous thing to do.
.Q&nscyvatiYP southern states are not
out of the Union, and never have been. They tried to 
leave, tout force of arms decided against them. Therefore 
they ought to be allowed to resume their normal relations 
with the government.
In addition to these arguments, there was a very great deal
_____•'  ^ ; ii ' -'5SSSJ
of discussion as to conditions in the South.^ This was not true 
parliamentary debate, but consisted simply of contradictions. The 
Radicals had their mass of "evidence and proof" for support, vhile 
the Conservatives had practically nothing but Grants report to 
fall back upon.
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CHAPTER III.
PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION.
Very shortly after the Radicals began to gain political 
strength, they saw the necessity for winning public opinion. Such 
a program as theirs would surely fail if it was not backed by a 
strong and constructive support. Accordingly they made a deliberate 
effort to gain converts for their party. This effort is seen, not 
only in the debates in Congress, but in the current literature of 
the time. The extent of Radical propaganda outside of Congress 
can be discussed only briefly here, but a rapid survey of its scope 
is necessary, to gain an understanding of Radical tactics.
Ever since the end of the war there had been published a 
great deal of literature about the South, which had been eagerly 
read and discussed by the people. Radlca,l specialists made very 
clever use of this interest, and flooded, the country with propa­
ganda. A number of influential daily newspapers, with their wide 
circulations, supported the party, and these became invaluable 
means of disseminating propaganda. Of the important magazines, 
the Atlantic Monthly, Harpers’ Monthly, and Harpers’ Weekly were 
strongest in their support of the Radicals.
There were a number of avenues by which the Radicals ap­
proached their purpose. A very important one was abuse of the 
President, both personal and political. Sometimes this was subtle 
and guarded, but more often, especially as the Radicals gained 
confidence, it was vulgar and crude. One sample will suffice.
"On the twenty-second of February, the birthday of 
Washington, Andrew Johnson disgraced himself (if that were 
possible) and outraged the memory of Washington and the memory
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of all the dead heroes of the Republic, by making a speech 
to a crowd of rebels and Copperheads* • • • Mever before 
was the Presidential office so disgraced by its occupant. 
Shame on the nation that places such babbling, drunken 
idiots in places of power.
The same article uses the following epithets: "His Boya.l Drunken­
ness,11 "Andy the Befuddled," "Andy the Mellow," "His Bachanalian 
Majesty," "The Old Sot," "The last American Pharaoh," "Andy of 
assassination fame," "A bullet-headed President, made president by 
a bullet," and others still more objectionable. The Radical press
was filled with abuse of the kind, and even respectable journals
2and magazines sometimes printed it.
Of course, reports of outrages in the South were played up 
extensively. This was, perhaps, the most affective weapon of the 
Radicals. They never let an opportunity slip to publish, to 
relate, or to hint at, stories of trie terrible sufferings of the 
loyalists in the South, whose only crime was loyalty to the Union. 
Scores of articles were written, travelers* reports were featured, 
letters supposed to have been written by loyalists were published. 
Of course, current news events were utilized. An instance of this 
was the Mew Orleans Riot which furnished rich material, not only 
on outrages, but on the culpability of Johnson,^ Stories of
5Freedmen became popular, and were printed everywhere. Essays and
editorials were used, of course, and even book reviews were not
neglected. The Atlantic Monthly reviewed two books together,
Abbott "Prison Life in the South," and Moen "English Travellers
and Italian Brigands," in order that an opportunity might be made
to compare Southerners unfavorably with the Italian brigands.^
War horrors were recalled, and kept in circulation, in order to
7stir up sectional feeling.
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The propaganda of the Radicals in Congress Is more important 
for the purpose of this study. Vihen the first session of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress met in December, 1865., the Radicals began 
their campaign to convert men to their politics. Some of the same 
methods of attack were used here as were used outside of Congress. 
Especially were reports of outrages stressed, told in letters or 
by hearsay.
Sprinkled all through the debate, from early meetings of the 
first session In 1865, down to the passage of the Reconstruction 
Act in 1S67, fire letters, purporting to have been written by 
persons In the South, These persons were supposed to be northern 
travellers, or, more often, southern loyalists. With one accord 
they painted gloomy pictures of the shocking conditions In the 
South, and implored Congress to act at once in their behalf, lest 
they be brutally murdered, or at the very least, driven out of 
their homes. They usually suggested a plan of intervention, and 
the plan coincided with the particular scheme which happened to 
be In favor with the Radicals at the time. These letters were 
written to Radle&l members only, and the recipients thoughtfully 
vdthheld the signatures. The excuse was that if the Identity of 
the persons became known, they would surely meet some dreadful 
destruction. Sumer appears to have received more letters than
anyone else. (Perhaps he was a more prolific letter writer.)
8In one speech he quotes parts from thirty-four letters.
.^ir. Sumner. I have in my hands a letter from Alabama,
from Milch I will read a short extract, as follows:
*Another big trade is going on: that of running 
negroes to Cuba and Brazil. They are running through
the country dressed in Yankee clothes, hiring men, 
giving them any price they ask, to make turpentine
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on the bay, sometimes on the rivers, sometimes to 
make sugar. They get them on the cars. Of course the 
negro don*t know where he is going. They get them onto 
the bay, and tell them to go on the steamer to go around 
the coast, and away goes poor Cuffee to slavery again. 
They are just cleaning out this section of the country 
of the likeliest men and women in it. Federal officers 
are mixed up in it, too,'
Mr. Johnson. vvho writes the letter? Give the name of
the writer.
IS r . Sumner. It is from a person in Alabama, whose name I
am requested not to communicate; but the gentleman is
well mown to members of the other house.
”Mr. Oufaaor. I have in my hand a letter which I received 
yesterday from a friend of our cause in Texas, and which 
is so important in its statements . . . that with the 
indulgence of the Senate I will read briefly from it.
Mr. icDougall. Allow me to ask the Senator to read the
signature.Get the name of the writer be given.
ir. Sumner. I shall not read the signature—
Me* yfaitaftsaU* a m  a m
’r. Summer. And for a very good reason— that I could not 
read the signature without exposing the writer to violence, 
if not to death. The letter is dated in Texas, November 19, 
1866. . . .  I read as follows*
*Dear sir; The really loyal men in this part of Texas 
concur in thinking that the first duty of the Republican 
party at the approaching session of Congress should be 
the passage of an act abolishing the sham state govern­
ments that have been set up in the South without authority 
of law. . . .
Our so-called Legislature adjourned on Tuesday last.
It was a worse and more disloyal body than the convention. 
All its members, except about six, showed by their speeches, 
proposed bills, and acts, that they were not merely in 
law, but in fact, public enemies of the United States.
The laws they have passed are infamous, and amount to 
neither more nor less than a cunningly devised system in­
tended to affect a practical restoration of slavery. For 
example* • . . The leading object of our legislature 
seemed to be to make contracts to labor specifically en- 
forcable, and at the same time, by stay and exemption 
laws, the contracts to pay for labor unenforcable, . • •
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I learn from persons of character that some of the 
members of our "Legislature" (Mr. Short, an ex-rebel 
captain for instance) boasted in private that they had 
never taken the amnesty oath prescribed by the President, 
and that in one county of Texas where only thirteen of 
the inhabitants had taken the oath, some two-hundred voted 
at the last election.
We have been in a horrible state of suspense here.
Had the earlier northern elections gone against the 
Republican party I should have had to promptly make my 
escape from Texas, if indeed, I could have got off at 
all. The spirit of the rebellion, down to that time, 
had waxed fiercer and more intolerant than it was in the 
middle of 1861. . . .  If Congress does not wipe out all 
that has been done, but abandons the loyal whites and the 
poor freedaen to rebel rule, I must and will emigrate.
Many others will do the same. In what a horrible condi­
tion will those be who can not get away!’
Memorials were used in the same way, but were infrequent,
perhaps for memorials must be signed.
"M£• S&BSll* I had intended, before I closed, to have read an extract from a memorial addressed to this house 
by Judge Thomas J . Durant, of Hew Orleans, in behalf of 
the loyalists, in which he describes truthfully the 
condition of that country, the murders and outrages that 
prevail, and I laight rviad from the scores of letters just 
sent to the venerable gentleman near me (Mr. Stevens) which 
are enough to stir the blood of age, and ought to convince 
us of the necessity of early and prompt action. I will 
ask to have the concluding portion of the memorial read.
*We pray you then, to set aside these hostile 
organizations, illegally and unconstitutionally created 
and incapable of self government, because hostile to 
the nation; and, under the nation’s power as conservator 
of the peace, authorize the loyal and true men, regard­
less of race or color, to organize governments, exclud­
ing so many of the unrepentant rebels as shall be found 
necessary for the permanent securing and preservation 
of the Union. . , . We plead for these things, not for 
ourselves and fellow-sufferers only, tut for our still 
bleeding country, from which capital, enterprise, free 
labor, free speech, the blessings of education, the 
rapid strides of internal improvements, and large pro­
gressive views are virtually expelled by ignorance, 
stupidity, bigotry, treason and rebellion.
We ask for early, speedy, sharp, short, and decisive action; and we ask it in the names and behalf 
of the millions of devoted friends of the Union in­
habiting the best parts of the continent, no one of
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whom can claim that he enjoys the blessings of free 
republican government, or the security which the 
Constitution of the United States guarantees to the 
citizen.1Bll
As in all debates where the issues are closely allied with 
passion, there was a great deal of emotional display during the 
sixteen months of debate on reconstruction. This was carefully 
fostered by the Radicals, who saw in it the best psychological ap
proach to their ends. Of course, there was much genuine emotion 
and sincere feeling in Congress, but there was also much affecta­
tion of sentiment, and oratory which was deliberately kindling. 
Stevens, Boutwell and Sumner were masters at this sort of thing. 
Their speeches are full of highly inflamatory passages.
"Does the gentleman yet ask for the * specific act1 that 
deprived these States of all the rights of States, and made 
them Enemies1? . . .  They threw off, and defied the authority 
of your Constitution, laws, and government. They obliterated 
from their State constitutions and laws every vestige of 
recognition of your government} they discarded all official 
oaths, and took in their places oaths to support your enemy*s 
government. They seized, in their States, all the nation’s 
property. Their Senators and Representatives in your Con­
gress insulted, bantered, defied and then left you. They 
expelled from their land or assassinated every inhabitant of 
known loyalty} they betrayed and surrendered your armies} 
they passed sequestration and other acts in flagitious viola­
tion of the law of nations, making every citizen of the 
United States an alien enemy, and placing in the treasury of 
their rebellion, all money and property due such citizens.
Kiey framed iniquity and universal murder into law. They 
besieged, for years, your capital, and sent your bleeding 
armies in rout, back here upon the very sanctuaries of your 
national power. Their pirates burned your unarmed commerce 
upon every sea. They carved the bones of your unburied 
heroes into ornaments, and drank from goblets made out of 
their skulls. They poisoned your fountains, put mines under 
your soldiers* prisons, organized bands whose leaders were 
concealed in your homes, and whose commissions ordered the 
torch and yellow fever to be carried to your cities, and to 
your women and children. They planned one universal bonfire 
of the North, from Lake Ontario to the Missouri. They 
murdered by systems of starvation and exposure, sixty thousand of your sons, as brave and heroic as ever martyrs were. They 
destroyed in five years of horrid war another army so large
that it would reach almost around the globe in marching 
columns; and then, to give the infernal drama a fitting 
close, and to concentrate into one crime all that is 
criminal in crime, and all that is detestable in barbarism, 
they killed the President of the United States.1,12
This passage comes from a speech of Shellabarger, the keenest 
Constitutional lawyer among the Radical group, and the man who, 
perhaps more than any other single Radical, won the confidence and 
respect of conservatives. Sumner appealed to the fanatic, Stevens 
spoke to the politician, but Shellabarger reasoned with the con­
servative patriot, and often he had his way. Except for Shella­
barger, the Radicals had few men who could meet the straightforward 
attacks of the Conservatives. Often several successive speeches 
would have nothing in them of worth or argument, but simply empty 
emotional appeals, which threw a kind of hypnotic spell over the 
meetings, and successfully blinded many conservatives to the real 
issue.
Pleas for loyalists were most frequently used.
"Already fifteen hundred Onion men have been massacred 
in cold blood— more than the entire population of some of 
the towns in my district— whose only crime has been loyalty 
to your flag, and In the single state of Texas alone; in 
all the revolted states, upon the testimony of your ablest 
generals, there is no safety to the property or lives of 
loyal men. Is this what the loyal North has been fighting 
for? Thousands of loyal white men driven like partridges 
over the mountain, homeless, houseless, penniless, today 
throng this capital. They fill the hotels, they crowd the 
avenue, they gather in these tessalated and marble corridors, 
they look down from these galleries, and with supplicating 
eyes they ask protection from the flag which floats above the 
Speaker*s chair; a flag which to them has thus far unfurled 
its stripes, but concealed the promise of Its stars.
For myself, may my right hand forget her cunning, and 
my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth if I desert them. 
. . .  The duty of today, and now, of this hour, Is to stand 
by the men who stood by the flag, the noble Union men of the 
South, black and white. For one, I mean to do It to the end 
of the chapter. • . • While I am ready to extend the olive
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branch of peace when it can be received in the spirit of 
peace, I now vote to unsheath the great sword of the Re­
public, and place it in the hands of the greatest captain 
of the age, that he may demand once more, in the name of 
the God of justice, the *unconditional surrender of the 
rebellion.*
In line with their policy of stirring emotion and passion, 
the Radicals played up the stories of outrages committed in the 
South. These were especially frequent in the first session, and 
in the first two months of the second session.
Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, always carried a vest pocket 
notebook, in which he entered all the reports of outrages which he 
heard.^ Of course he exposed himself to a good deal of ridicule, 
but nevertheless his stories were effective. He presented the 
contents of his booklet in the debates, either as stories, or in 
tabulated form.
Two examples, the first from Sumner and the second from 
Stevens, show the effectiveness of the stories* In many cases 
the extent to which the Radicals were willing to go seems almost 
absurd.
nI do not stop to dwell on the instances of frightful 
barbarism. There is one which had been authenticated in 
the court of the prevost marshal, where a colored girl was 
roasted alivet And another writer, in a letter just re­
ceived, describes a system of ♦burning* in ?/ilkes county, 
Georgia, as *a mild means of extorting from the freed people 
a confession as to where they have their arms and money 
concealed.* Ho says ‘They were held in the blaze.’ Think 
of it sir, here in our country, ’they were held in the 
blaze.* And the national government looks onI
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"A gentleman from Richmond, who had personal knowledge 
of the facts, told me the circumstances of the murder. A 
colored man, driving the family of his employer, drove his 
wagon against a wagon containing Hatson and his family. The 
wagon of Watson was broken. The next day i/atson went to the employer of the colored man and complained. The employer
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offered to pay Watson every dollar that he might assess 
for the damage that had been done* ’Not1 said he, *1 claim 
the right to chastize the scoundrel*1 He followed the 
colored man, took out his revolver, and deliberately shot 
him dead in the presence of the community. No civil authority 
would prosecute him; and when taken into custody by the 
military authority, he is discharged by order of the Presi­
dent*"16
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CHAPTER IV.
OFFICIAL REPORTS OF CONDITIONS IN THE SOOTH.
In the summer of 1865 President Johnson asked Carl Schurz to 
go on a tour of the South, to gather and report Information on the 
conditions existing there. Schurz hesitated, because of financial 
reasons. The Badicals saw here an excellent opportunity to get 
"proof" of Johnson*s failure in the South— proof which they could 
use in their campaigning for converts. Stanton told Schurz that 
it was **absolutely necessary" for the "cause” that he should go. 
Sumner quietly offered to raise a subscription, and this made the 
trip possible,1 Schurz left for the South with very definite ideas 
as to what his party expected him to find there; of eourse he found 
those things.
He left in July, 1865* and spent six weeks touring the states 
of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Texas.2 At intervals he sent reports to the President, and pub­
lished a number of unsigned letters in Radical newspapers. When 
Johnson rebuked him for his unauthorized publication in the papers 
fte replied angrily that he was doing it unofficially, and that the 
people had a right to know what he was finding out about the South.
His report was simply a piece of Radical propaganda, which 
intended to show that conditions In the South were not satisfactory, 
and that the President’s policy was not wise. It may be summed up 
in a few words.
The masses of the southern people, and most of the 
southern leaders, are loyal, in so far as loyalty can
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consist of submission to necessity. Except in rare cases, 
there is an entire absence of that national spirit which 
forms the basis of true loyalty and patriotism.
The ordinances abolishing slavery were passed by the 
South only under pressure, and the South will not hesitate 
to evade them, in spirit or practice. Emancipation is 
necessarily observed in outward form but the negro is 
regarded, not as free, but as the slave of society* 
Legislation on the part of the southern states has ex­
pressed the tendency toward this new form of slavery.
There is a tendency to deprive the negro of his 
ri#its. This will increase, and the result will be to 
plunge the South into resistless fluctuations and anarchi­
cal confusion. The only practical method of avoiding this 
evil is to continue Federal control until conditions 
settle down under a full recognition of the rights of free 
labor. Of course, federal supervision is, in Itself, not 
wholly desirable, and the period in which it must be exer­
cised ought to be made as short as possible. Two things 
might help in this. First, the government ought to de­
clare that the South will be under supervision until 
society is stabalised there. This will have a salutary 
effect on the attitude of the South. Second, the govern­
ment ought to endow the negro with some measure of 
political power. The South will never do this voluntarily, 
and the only way to accomplish it will be to make it a 
condition precedent to the readmission of the South into 
the Union.
6*.
The report was all that the Radicals had hoped for# Sumner 
wrote Schurz that it was "all that I had expected; very able, 
elaborate, complete, full of facts and i d e a s . I t  was the more 
valuable because it was made by a man who inspired so much respect 
and confidence. People did not suspect him. Had not Johnson him­
self sent Schurz there? And had not Schurz gone down a Johnson 
man, and come back convinced that Johnson was wrong? He made it 
very clear that Johnson*s policy was failing to restore the 
southern states to such a condition that they could properly take 
their places in the Union.
Another fruitful source of Radical propaganda was found in the 
official reports of the officers of the Freedmen*s Bureau, These 
reports were very contradictory, and differed from district to 
district, hit in general they formed a mass of material very use­
ful to the party.
The very nature of the Bureau prevented these accounts from 
presenting true pictures of conditions in the South, The Bureau 
was an organization of the Radical party, legalized it is true, 
and set in motion by legislative authority, but utilized for party 
purposes. The reports were sometimes deliberately falsified, and 
almost always colored by the necessity to paint dark pictures of 
conditions, in order to assure the continuance of the Bureau,
Even when conditions were exactly as they were reported, the 
Bureau was sometimes at fault# Bureau officials were directed to 
do things which were deliberately irritating to the southern ivhites, 
so that they might be goaded into some violence which would furnish 
talking points for the Radicals# Any Indication of disrespect or
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disorder was to be reported at once to the Radicals in Washington, 
so that it could be used there. Race conflict was intentionally 
fostered. Negroes were given false impressions of their rights and 
privileges, and so led to make themselves very annoying to the 
whites. It was even claimed that sometimes Bureau officials sug­
gested to negroes that they do things which were certain to cause 
disorder which could be reported to Washington, and furnish ma­
terial for sensational articles.^ No wonder that one young of­
ficer in Georgia found his work "fearfully disgusting.
Of course, not all of the officials were dishonest. The 
hifeer officers were men of sincerity and integrity. But there 
were abuses of power, especially among the lower officials.
The reports of the officers were made with great frequency, 
and were used in debate. They served to give apparent substantia­
tion to reports of similar conditions from other sources. Their 
use in debate may be illustrated with examples.
"Mr. Donnelly. I will give . . .  an argument, most potent 
and convincing, as to the kind of * peace and quiet* which 
now reign in the South without negro suffrage, and which 
will remain there so long as negro suffrage is denied.
General Ord has just made a report upon the condition of 
thing in Arkansas. He sums up matters as follows:
*Outrages, assaults and murders committed on the 
persons of freed men and women are being continually 
reported from all sections of the state, and a decided 
want of disposition to punish offenders apparently 
exists with the local civil officers, and in the minds 
of the people. There have been reported fifty-two 
murders of freed persons by white men in this state in 
the past three or four months, and no reports have been 
received that the murderers have been imprisoned or 
punished. In some parts of the state, particularly in 
the south west and south east, freedmen*s lives are 
threatened if they report their wrongs to the agent of 
the bureau, and in many cases the parties making the reports are missed and never heard of afterward. It 
Is believed that the number of murders reported is not 
half the number committed during the time mentioned.*"7
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"Sc- po.ana.UJ- I will quote from the report of the officers 
at theFreedruen*s Bureau, as to the state of affairs in 
Tennessee* • • •
* Captain Kendrick reports in substance that having 
proceeded to Union City he conversed with many of the 
citizens, who told him that but few of the freedmen 
were left about there, as they were driving them away 
as rapidly as possible. • • • The citizens force them 
to fly by * . . shooting, beating, whipping, and cheat­
ing them. The superintendent of the bureau there, in­
vestigating a case of assault upon a negro, was compelled 
to desist by threats upon his life. . . .  A freedman 
named Callum was whipped by a man named Stanley for say­
ing that he had fought in the Union army. A Mr. Roscol, 
county trustee, has been persistently persecuted by a 
gang of desperadoes because he was prominent in defend­
ing the Union, and has been shot at several times while 
sitting in his house. About a dozen bullet holes may be 
seen in his door.*”8
Another report which was of great value to the Radicals was 
that made by the committee which investigated the riot at New 
Orleans. On July 30, 1866, a serious riot broke out at New 
Orleans, between the State and municipal authorities on the one 
hand, and loyalists on the other. The situation was very much 
complicated by the condition existing throughout the State, Since 
November, 186$, a number of the State offices had been claimed by 
two sets of officials, each professing authority. Johnson* s 
reconstructed government was headed by Governor Wells, Democrats 
composed the State legislature, and controlled the city government 
of New Orleans.
The old State Convention of 1864 had been out of existence 
for a long time, but a meeting was called for July 30, 1866. 
Members of the Republican party, (carpetbaggers, scallawags and 
negroes,)claimed that Wells called the meeting. Wells denied it,
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and said that the president of the convention called it.^ At 
any rate, the assembling of the convention was opposed by the 
State legislature, and by the mayor of Hew Orleans, James Monroe.
On July 25 Monroe applied to General Baird, who was in command of 
the military forces near New Orleans, to know if he could be al­
lowed to disperse the assembly by arresting its members. Baird 
replied that he could not, but that if there should be any riot 
the military would assist the city police in keeping the peace.
On the twenty-eighth there was a Radical Republican mass meeting, 
largely attended by negroes, at which "violent and incendiary 
speeches were made, and the negroes called upon to arm themselves. 
After this meeting the Lieutenant Governor and the Attorney 
General of the State telegraphed to Johnson. They wished to arrest 
the convention members under process of the criminal court, and 
asked "Is the military to interfere to prevent process of court?" 
Johnson, not understanding the situation, replied "Hie military 
will be expected to sustain and not to obstruct or interfere with 
the proceedings of the c o u r t s . T h i s  telegram was later used by 
the Radicals in an attempt to show that Johnson was using the 
military forces to suppress the convention. On that same day 
General Baird wired Stanton. "A convention has been called with 
the sanction of Governor Wells, to meet here on Monday. The 
Lieutenant Governor, and city authorities, think it unlawful, 
and propose to break it up by arresting the delegates. I have 
given no orders on the subject. • • • Please instruct me at once 
by t e l e g r a p h , Stanton did not answer. He later admitted that 
he had deliberately withheld the telegram from the President. Had 
Johnson known of it his instructions to Baird, and his reply to
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the Lieutenant Governor would have been effective to prevent the 
riot.1^
The convention was to meet Monday noon. Monroe had given 
General Baird the impression that the convention was not to con­
vene until six o*elock. About ten o*clock in the morning, Lieu­
tenant Governor Voorhies asked for troupes, and Baird sent for 
them, giving instructions that they were to arrive about five 
o*clock, an hour before he supposed they would be needed. In the 
morning also, Mayor Monroe enlarged and concentrated his police 
force, and gave the men arms. The convention met at noon, but a 
quorum was not present, and the meeting adjourned, intending to 
meet again a little later. During the intermission a procession 
of negroes paraded through the streets, and returned to the 
Mechanics Institute where the meetings were held. Just before they 
reached the Institute they came into conflict with a mob of whites, 
who fired upon them. The police arrived at once, advancing in 
concert from three directions, and Joined the mob in firing. The 
negroes fled into the hall, where the meeting was in progress.
The doors were barricaded, but were broken in, and a most shocking
massacre occurred. Forty-eight persons were killed, most of than
15negroes, and more than two-hundred were injured. By the time 
the troupes arrived the massacre was over, but Baird proclaimed 
martial law, "because the police are regarded by a large portion 
of the community as the rioters, and were feared."1^
Of course, the riot caused much horror throughout the nation. 
Sheridan, Baird*s superior, wrote to Grant, "The more information 
I obtain of the affair of the thirtieth in this city, the more 
revolting it becomes. It was no riot* it was an absolute massacre
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by the police, which was not excelled in murderous cruelty by that 
of Fort Pillow. It was a murder which the mayor and police of this 
city perpetrated without the shadow of a necessity; furthermore,
I believe it was premeditated, and every indication points to 
this#1,17
On August 1, General Baird appointed a military board to 
investigate the riots. The next day the board began taking testi­
mony, and continued until late in the month# The next Congress 
appointed an investigating committee, which used the testimony al­
ready gathered, and examined the documents of the President, and of 
Stanton, The conclusion was "that the whole drift and current of 
the evidence tends irresistibly to the conclusion that there
was . . .  a preconcerted plan and purpose of attack upon this con-
1Svention, provided any possible Pretext could be found."
Johnson*s telegram to the Democratic Lieutenant Governor say­
ing that the "military will be expected to sustain and not to 
obstruct or interfere with the proceedings of the courts," was 
very unfortunate. The Radicals easily convinced people in the 
North that Johnson sympathized with the Democrats, that he opposed 
the meeting of Republicans, that he hated the negro and was sup­
porting the rebels. The logical next step was to insinuate that 
he was aware of the preconceived plan to prevent the meeting, and 
had attempted to use the military forces to support the Democrats 
and rebels in their plan to break it up.
President Johnson believed that the Radicals in Washington had 
been responsible for the riot. In the fall of 1866, when he made 
his famous "Swing Abound the Circle" tour, he spoke at St. Louis.
An interruption, "How about New Orleans?" brought the answer, "If
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you will take up the riot at New Orleans and trace It hack to Its
source, you will find out who was responsible for the blood that
was shed there, You will find that the riot at New Orleans was
substantially planned in the Radical Congress, • . . You will find
that another rebellion was commenced having its origin in the
Radical Congress."1^ Welles wrote "There is little doubt that the
New Orleans riots had their origin with the Radical majority of
Congress in Washington, It is a part of a deliberate conspiracy,
and was to be the commencement of a series of bloody affrays through
the States lately in rebellion. . . • Stanton is evidently in deep
sympathy and concert with the Radicals in this matter, « • . (He
is) himself complicated with, if not a prime mover in, the New
20Orleans difficulties, and these mischievous rumors."'-
Some extracts from the testimony will serve to show, both the 
nature of the riot, and the usefulness to the Radicals of such 
materials.
From the testimony of F. Mollere, a member of the convention.
(He describes the assembling of the convention, and the siege 
of the hall.) "The door was burst again, the third time, by 
the police, and Mr. Horton stood in the middle of the hall 
with a white handkerchief and said *Do not shootj we stir- 
render.1 They fired, and Mr. Horton was shot in the arm.
. , . Some of the men jumped out of the window', and the 
moment they got down there I saw the policemen fire and 
shoot at them. . . .  I could see the colored men rushing to 
(the police) for protection. Then they would hold them and 
shoot them," (He tells how he left the hall with another 
man, and went down stairs, where they met a clerk.) "I 
said, *For God*s sake do not touch raej protect me.* He 
said, *Come down stairs with me.* As I got to the foot of 
the steps a regular file of police fired at me, and said,
*Kill him, the God damned Yankee.1 I owe my life to one 
of the sergeants of police. The crowd was crying out as I
got to the corner, *Kill him, the damned Yankee — - ---- . *
Clark saved my life there by saying I was a rebel. I saw a poor old colored man on the sidewalk, and I saw three men 
rushing behind him with their pistols In their hands. They 
were citizens, not police. As they got up to this colored
man one said *Here Is one of them,1 and put his pistol to 
his head; and the colored man turned around laughing, and 
said ’What is the matter?* As he said that I saw his brains 
blown out,’23*
From the testimony of G. B. Gourdeau, a spectator.
(He describes the killing of a negro watermellon vender.)
I suppose it was for their amusement, nothing else. They 
have threatened the lives of the witnesses who testify as 
to the killing. Threats have been made to Union men that 
if they give testimony to this commission they would have 
violence done to them. I have been told that it would be 
dangerous for me to give evidence before this court. Loyal 
men are being disarmed by the pollge, while others are still 
permitted to carry their weapons.22
Here was evidence exactly suited to the Radical*s plans for 
propaganda. The United States flag had been fired upon. The old 
•spirit of the Confederacy was still alive, and even the old Con-
Eerate organisations were ready for instant mobilization,ason was open and unashamed, Confederate uniforms were paraded, old rebel military units were still in organized existence. Johnson*s government was not able to deal with the situation. 
Johnson*s officers, if not Johnson himself, were Confederate 
sympathizers* United States military forces in the South were 
accessary, and the President had been found using them to the 
interests of the rebels, and to the great hurt of loyal men. A 
number of persons were threatened for giving evidence before the 
committee. The whole Southern attitude was described as one of 
fiendish cruelty* The President was reported to have garbled 
the accounts of the riot, and to have permitted the New York 
Times to publish expurgated notices of it. He was said to have 
been "reluctant* to give up the correspondence relative to it.2-* 
With the skillful Radical stress on these things, what 
wonder is it that most of the country agreed that the report was
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ffa mo3t convincing refutation of the foolish assertion * * • that 
the President’s Southern policy is just to all, as well as for­
giving and conciliatory to the South.
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Perhaps the most Important single piece of propaganda which 
the Radicals had at their command was the report of the Joint Com­
mittee, made after an exhaustive Investigation Into the condition 
of the South* At the meeting of the Joint Committee on January 12, 
1866, Bingham moved "that sub-committees . . .  be appointed to 
examine and report upon the present condition of the States com­
posing the late so-called Confederate States of America."1 This 
was agreed to, and at the next meeting Fessenden appointed the 
four sub-committees.
No. I. Tennessee.
Grime s, Conservative.
Bingham, Conservative.
Grider, Democrat.
No. II. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina.
Howard, Radical.
Conkling, Radical.
Blow, Conservative.
No, III. Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas,
Harriss, Radical.
Boutwell, Radical*
Morrill, Radical.
No. IV. Louisiana, Florida, Texas.
Williams, Radical.
Washburn, Radical.
Rogers, Democrat.
The choice of members for these sub-committees is proof of 
Fessendens Radical sympathy. As has been shown in an earlier 
chapter, the work of the sub-coraraittee on Tennessee was already 
fairly well mapped out by public opinion in Congress. The Radicals 
seemed to consider that Tennessee was the safest place to concen­
trate the Conservatives; at least that was the only sub-committee
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which did not have a Radical majority* It was so safe that not a 
single Radical was wasted there. The second and fourth sub-cora- 
mlttees were each given Radical majorities, and the third was com­
posed entirely of Radicals. It might be objected that, when nine 
members out of the group of fifteen were Radicals, Fessenden could 
not help giving some Radical majorities. True, but his choice of 
members discounts that argument. The most influential of the 
Radical opponents, Reverdy Johnson, was not given a place on any 
committee. The Tennessee group was packed entirely with Conserva­
tives and Democrats, to get theta out of the way. Since the 
Tennessee question had practically been settled outside of the 
Committee, a Radical sub-committee there would not have made any 
difference, Fessenden could have given Conservative majorities 
to each of the three Important sub-committees,
The sub-committees began at once to take testimony and collect 
evidence, and continued work until the end of April. Witnesses 
were all examined in Washington, and this exercised a natural 
selective Influence over the character of the people available. 
Added to this was a deliberate effort on the part of the Radicals 
to pack the number with persons of Radical sympathy. This ac­
counts to a great extent for the extreme tone of the nfindings.” 
Army officers who had returned from the South, officers of 
the Freedman*s Bureau, southern loyalists, and carpet-bagger 
officers of the southern states comprise far the greatest number 
of witnesses, bit there was a sprinkling of Southerners, to give 
an appearance of impartiality. These Southerners were of two 
kinds; a few were eminently respectable and prominent persons, 
such as Robert E, Lee, whose testimony was sane and reasonable;
"some were southern hot-heads, whose testimony did more harm than 
good, and was pointed to with scorn and horror by the Radicals, as 
ominous types of what the South was thinking. One hundred forty- 
four witnesses were called, altogether. Seventy-seven of these 
were Northerners living in the South, most of them for periods 
less than two years; thirty-eight were northern array officers; 
fifteen were officers of the Freedraen* s Bureau; ten were federal 
customs collectors; and sixteen were white southern sympathizers. 
Of the Northerners living in the South, some were simply persons 
making extended travels.
In March, 1666, the majority report, and the verbaturn ac­
counts of the witnesses was published, and 150,000 copies were 
printed and distributed by the members of Congress.^ The 
minority report, signed by Johnson, Grider, and Rogers, was 
omitted from the publication, and received scant consideration 
except in the Conservative newspapers.
The work of the sub-committee on Tennessee has already been 
considered.^- It was much more thorough than that of any of the 
other sub-committees. Hie questions were more spontaneous, and 
show less desire to draw the witnesses along a ready-marked line.
The second 3Ub-comnittee, examining Virginia, North and 
South Carolina, called seventy-one carefully chosen witnesses, 
including several negro ex-slaves. After much Judicious question­
ing this group was able to produce evidence which showed the 
following. Southerners have no respect for the United States, 
and the whole South is a "nursery of treason," Southerners have 
organized Into conspiracies, or "general understandings," which 
hope to accomplish the dissolution of the Union by legislative
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means, as soon as representatives are admitted to Congress. The 
State legislature of Virginia has a rebel majority. Rebels vote 
without the "slightest restrictions." They pay taxes with great 
reluctance* They would probably support enemies of the United
States in the event of a foreign war, and would revive the Con­
federacy under such favorable conditions. They would repudiate 
the Federal debt* The pardons granted by Johnson have had a 
mischievous effect In fostering disloyalty, Which is constantly 
increasing. The condition of the freedmen is "deplorable," and 
the Freedman* s Bureau is a necessity. Negro franchise is much 
opposed, although negroes are intelligent, and very anxious for 
education, Negroes are frequently whipped, strung up by the 
thumbs, or otherwise mistreated* Tit© courts would not convict 
rebels in cases concerning treason, or murder if the case Involved 
a negro or a Northerner, Northerners have "no chance at all" in
State courts. Opposition to Northerners is very strong, and is
5fostered by the women and the press.
Testimony taken by the third sub-committee, concerning 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, stressed much the same 
things. The President^ policy of leniency has resulted in a 
change of attitude in the South, Southerners have been "spoiled, 
like children," and the anti-Union sentiment is growing more 
bitter. The women and the press are responsible for some of the 
continued hostility. Organized militia and secret societies exist, 
whose object is to destroy the Union. The South would gladly 
repudiate the Federal war debt, and will make claims for war 
losses and for freed slaves. Freedoen are "persecuted," with 
cruelty and oppression common. The Freedman*s Bureau is necessary
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to help the Hegro, who is anxious to work and to learn, ft would 
be fatal to withdraw the troups.^
Evidence brought out by the fourth sub-committee, on Louisiana 
Florida and Texas, is similar also. Disloyalty is increasing.
The pardon system has been unsatisfactory, and voters, and even 
State officials are frequently unpardoned rebels. According to 
Governor Marvin of Florida, half of the delegates to the State 
legislature were active secessionists, and a quarter more were 
Southern sympathizers* Except for the support of the militia, 
nthe raost rabid and violent secessionists” would b© in power.
The Freedmen* s Bureau is necessary to prevent mistreatment of the 
negro, and the troups are necessary to help the loyalists*7
The sub-committees had a list of stock questions which were 
asked almost all the witnesses. If there was a southern sympa­
thizer giving testimony, the questions were briefer, and many were 
omitted. They did not ask such men as Robert E. Lee, or Governor 
Johnson of Georgia, how they and their friends felt toward the 
freedmen. They did not want such answers to appear on the records. 
The questions were often leading, and if the witness did not 
answer as was expected or desired, they attempted to trap him into 
admitting some minor point, over which they made much. If a 
v/itness admitted that he knew of Just one case where a negro was 
mistreated., the Radicals were Jubilent, and claimed that his 
testimony showed that the Freedmen*s Bureau was necessary to 
protect the negro.
With the more ignorant of their witnesses, they often stated 
the position, and then asked if It was not so? For instance the 
following, asked with the intent to trap a Southerner into a
i
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false position.
Question; I understand it to be your opinion that generosity 
or liberality toward the South would be the surest 
means of regaining their good opinion?
Answer; Yes.8
Some typical quotations from the testimony will serve to 
show the sort of questions asked, and the kind of ansvv'ers which 
were desired.
From the testimony of John W. Hecks, Customs Collector in Florida.
"Question. Then all the officers of the government there, 
and those chosen to represent that state in 
Congress, as I understand, were chosen by men 
who were chosen during the War?
Answer. Yes sir.
Question. And those who were not pardoned, as well as those 
who were, voted for their election?" (Hecks had 
not previously mentioned the voters, or their 
qualifications. This was obviously a leading 
question.)
Answer. les sir; and whether they had been there three 
days or had lived there three years did not 
matter. They would come back, according to the 
instructions given by Provisional Governor Marvin, 
would vote the next day, pardoned or unpardoned."
From the testimony of J. P. Stiles.
"If these State governments are permitted to 
reconstruct, and to go on in the manner they 
are going on, the South will remain a nursery 
of treason. The rebels say ’we know that we 
are whipped; we are overpowered; but we hate 
you, and we will teach our children’s children 
to hate you!’ Their favorite expression is,
’Every dog has his day, and the time will come, 
sometime or other, when an opportunity will 
present itself to us.*
Question. Is that feeling very general?
Answer. Yes sir.
Question, '••'hat chance does a Union or a Northern man stand 
in their courts.
... ........  - ■ IAnswer. Ko chance at all, , , , The popular feeling is 
against him altogether, and he has it all to 
butt against. . * . There is no show for justice 
to a Union man in any case that affects rebels*
Question. VVhat chance does a freedraan stand for justice at 
their hands?
Answer. As a general thing, he does not stand any chance 
for justice at all.*9
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From the testimony of Rev. L. M. Hobbs, of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Educational Service.
"Question. What do you find to be the present temper and
spirit of the people in Florida in reference to 
the general government?
Answer. It is bitterj much more so now than it was three 
or four months ago.
Question. How do you explain this change that has taken 
place in their feelings, or in the expression 
of them?
Answer. I consider it is because of the lenience mani­
fested by the present administration} first in 
extending the privilege of amnesty, and second, 
in re-establishing the civil government, throw­
ing the affairs of the state, the administration 
of the law, in the hands of probate and circuit 
judges, leaving the military to have control 
only in some cases where capital punishment, or 
some punishment of that kind, can be inflicted.
Also the general opposition that has grown up 
within the last three months to the negro having 
civil rights, the right of suffrage, etc."10
In the published report there was an index which listed the 
questions asked most frequently, Under each question was a list 
of the witnesses who had made negative answers, and a similar 
list of those who had made affirmative answers. This index 
enabled one to see at once how the majority of witnesses stood on 
any question. On every question the majority was with the Radicals. 
This was misleading, because of the picked nature of the group of 
witnesses. In addition, the index was not compiled with strict
honesty. For instance, the question was frequently asked, "Have 
you seen, or do you know of, indications of hostility toward the 
Onion?" David Patterson, the President1s son-in-law, was listed 
as answering in the affirmative. That question was not asked 
Patterson directly, and the only referenoe which could, by any 
stretch of the imagination, bear on the subject is this. "During 
the war . « . (Onion men) were persecuted."11 He said nothing 
else on the subject of hostility. On that same question there 
were two others listed as making affirmative answers who did not. 
One of them, Governor Johnson of Georgia, was very decidedly 
negative in his testimony. In a number of cases the index was 
falsified in a similar manner.
The following tabulation shows the questions asked most 
frequently, with the number of negative and affirmative answers, 
and the number of such answers found by the various committees. 
"Part I," "Part II," etc., refer to the testimony taken by the 
first sub-committee, to that of the second sub-committee, etc.
Have you seen, or do you know of 
the Union?
Affirmative. 89
Part I 5 
Part II 39
III 25
IV 20 32
indications of hostility toward
Negative. 36 
Part I
Part II 10
III 15IV 11
32 of the affirmative answers, and 11 of the negative 
answers, were given by army officers. The index lists 
92 affirmatives.
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i hostility to the United States 
Lee?
increased since the surrender
Affirmative. 21 Negative. 3
Part I 1 Part I
II 6 II —
III 11 III 2
IV 3 IV 1
Negative answers were given by General 0. H. Thomas, and 
Governor Johnson of Georgia* The index omits Johnson’s 
testimony.
Do the Southerners still hold to their states rights and secession 
theory? Would they be willing to fight against the United States 
in support of their theories?
Affirmative. 50
Part I
IX 22
III 17
IV 11
Negative. 14
Part I 1
II 10
III 2
IV 1
13 army officers answered in the affirmative.
What effect has the Executive leniency and free granting of 
pardons had on the South?
Beneficial. 3 Harmful. 42
Part I Part III II 29III 3 III 6IV IV 7
The index omits the testimony of R. E. Lee, and gives only 
2 who considered the effect beneficial. 6 array men thought 
that the effect was harmful.
Do Southern politicians hope to control the Union policy by 
political means, as soon as they are elected to Congress?
Affirmative, 20
Part I
II
III 910
Negative.
Southerners were not asked this question.
Is tiie South reluctant to pay taxes for the National debt? 
Affirmative. 26 Negative. 1
Part I
II
III
IV
16
7
5
Part I
II
III —
IV 1
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The one negative answer was given by General Lorenzo 
Thomas. The question was not asked any of the Southerners.
Will the South expect compensation for slaves emancipated, and 
property destroyed during the war?
Affirmative. 12
Part I
II
III
IV
26
4
Negative. 3
Part I —
II 1
III —
IV 2
Generals Spencer, Thomas and Grierson answered affirmative­
ly. Southerners were not asked this question.
Have you seen any manifestations of hostility toward Union men, 
whether of the North or South?
Affirmative. 71 Negative. 15
Part I 4 Part III 37 II 4III 14 III 7IV 16 IV 4
27 army men answered affirmatively, and 5 negatively. 
R. E* Lee was listed with the affirmatives. He had 
said that he had known of cases where Southern people 
would "avoid* Northerners.
Is the Freedman treated with hostility or cruelty?
Affirmative. 87 Negative,78707 36
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Part 1
II 37
III 27
IV 20
F<3.r* X — —
II 21
III 8
IV 7
Will the negro work for a fair wage and good treatment?
Affirmative, 59 Negative* 4
Part I
II
IIIIV
415
26
14
Part III
III
IV
1
2
1
Are the United States troups and the Freedman’s Bureau necessary 
in the South?
Affirmative. 73
Part I
II
III
IV
5
2326
19
negative. 10
Part I
II 3
III 4
IV 3
37 military men answered in the affirmative. Only 3, 
among them General Lorenzo Thomas, answered in the 
negative.
The majority report appeared with the testimony. It had 
been drawn up by Fessenden, and was signed by every Republican 
member of the Committee, It was very cleverly and subtly worded, 
and made to stress the points which the Radicals were especially 
anxious to bring out. The following is a much shortened summary 
of the report, and uses the original language wherever possible* 
When Congress opened in 1865, the President’s 
Message stated, in general terms, what had been done 
in the South, but the details were not communicated
to Congress. It was apparent that It was not proper to 
confide In the judgment of one man, no matter how exalted 
his station, when the question involved the welfare of 
the Republic in all future time. Congress felt in­
competent to proceed without securing further informa­
tion, and hence this testimony was taken.
Southerners claim that, if they had no legal right 
to secede, then they never left the Union, and still have 
their full rights. The committee finds this position 
untenable, as it would make civil war a pastime at which 
any state may play. It is not Important whether the 
South is in or out of the Union. All must agree that 
she failed to perform her obligations to the Union, and 
so cannot expect to enjoy its rights and privileges.
Let us look at the facts shown by the evidence 
taken by the committee. Hardly is the war closed be­
fore the people of these insurrectionary states come 
forward, professing no repentance, glorying In the crime 
they have committed, avowing still, as the uncontradicted 
testimony of Mr. Stephens and many others proves, an 
adherence to the pernicious doctrine of secession, and 
insist upon their rights as States, and proclaim that 
they will submit to no conditions whatever as preliminary 
to their resumption of power under that Constitution 
which they still claim the right to repudiate.
The Southern press abounds with abuse of the 
institutions and people of the Loyal states. The na­
tional airs are scoffed at, and the national banner Is
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openly insulted at public meetings. Witnesses of the 
highest character, and having the best means of observa­
tions, show tliat the Freedmen* s Bureau is almost uni­
versally opposed by the mass of the population, and 
could not exist efficiently without military protec­
tion. Without the protection of the troups, loyal 
men would be obliged to abandon their homes. Vindictive 
and malicious hatred is felt toward the freedmen. Prej­
udice against color is assiduously cultivated by the 
public journals, and leads to acts of cruelty, oppression 
and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains 
to prevent or punish. The people of the rebellious 
states pay their United Btates taxes with great reluctance, 
and would repudiate the national debt if they could do so.
Generally prevailing opinion in the South defends 
the legal right of secession. While the South appears 
willing to submit, it is clear that the real motive is a 
desire to obtain the advantages which will be derived 
from a representation in Congress. The effect of our 
lenience has been to change the abject submission of 
the people to an insulting denial of our authority.
There are two points of action open. The Worth 
might waive formalities and admit the Confederate 
States at once, trusting to time and experience to 
set all things right; but this seems unreasonable to 
the committee. The committee offers the following for 
consideration*-
1. The Southern States were, at the close of the war,
86^
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with no State constitutions or other forms which could 
form the basis for legal relations between them and the 
United States.
2* Congress can not be expected to recognize their 
representatives.
3, Congress would not be justified in admitting 
such communities without proper guarantees securing 
the civil rights of all citizens. ^
This report proved very valuable to the Radicals. It was 
much used in the election campaigning in 1866, and served to 
justify the Radicals to their constituencies. In Congress too, 
it was made to serve its purpose, and had a good deal to do with 
the conversion of some of the waverers. The evidence of verbaturn 
testimony, reiterated again and again, seemed to prove only too 
clearly that the South needed Congressional attention, and that 
Johnson1s reconstruction had been a failure.
By all these ways then, the Radicals strove to build up 
public opinion. That they were deceiving the public they did not 
care, so long as the public was convinced. And their success was 
great. By means of their propaganda they built up their party 
from a small group of politicians and fanatics to a great organize 
tion which controlled the policies of the government, and embraced 
most of the people of the North, with their propaganda they built 
up a background which carried their policies through Congress, 
even though their measures were patently unjust and unconstitutional!
Their program was put through Congress without the aid of any 
great debate on their part. They had simply to point to this 
elaborate fabrication of lies which they had built up, and appeal 
for support.
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CHAPTER VI
THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF MARCH 2, 1867
CHAPTER VI.
THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF 1667.
By the time the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress 
met in December, 1866, it had become evident that most of the 
southern states would refuse the Fourteenth Amendment. The Radi­
cals were willing that they should. They had shown, by their ac­
tion on the Restoration Bill, that they did not really desire that 
the amendment should become the basis of reconstruction. Now they 
had an excuse for abandoning it as such. They stressed over and 
over how the South had "flung the Amendment in their teeth." It 
was a satisfying excuse, apparently putting the South at fault for 
the failure.
The first week of the session brought forth a number of plans 
for a new Congressional reconstruction. Only two of these were 
important. The second day of the session Brooaall introduced in 
the House a resolution that the Committee on Territories be in­
structed "to Inquire into the expedience of reporting a bill pro­
viding territorial governments for the several districts of country 
within the jurisdiction occupied by the once existing states of 
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas, and giving to all adult 
male inhabitants, . . .  not participants of the late rebellion,
2full and equal political rights In such territorial governments." 
This was passed by a strict party vote, 107 yeas, 37 nays, and 47 
not voting. On December 6, Sumner Introduced a resolution
"declaring the true principles of reconstruction, the jurisdiction 
of Congress over the whole subject, the illegality of existing
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governments in the rebel states, and the exclusion of such states
with illegal governments from representation in Congress, and from
3voting on Constitutional amendments*”
On December 10, a resolution was proposed providing that the 
southern states would be admitted to the Union if they accepted the 
amendment.^ This was referred to the Joint Comtaittee, without de­
bate, which constituted a practical failure. Those resolutions in 
which Congress was interested, and over which there was division 
of opinion, were hotly debated before being referred. That this 
was referred without debate shows the changing attitude of the new 
Congress.
On December 13, Stevens introduced a bill providing for civil
5government in North Carolina. Since no civil government existed 
there, he said, it was the duty of Congress to establish one. His 
bill provided for calling a convention, which should frame a state 
constitution, and submit it to Congress. All male citizens, 21 
years of age or over, who could read or write, or whom might own 
in fee real estate to the assessed value of $100 or more, might 
vote for the members of this Convention. No one who had had the 
right to vote before was to be disqualified, but in order to 
eliminate southern members from the Convention, it was provided 
that the delegates must take a very strict oath. The bill also 
provided for indictment for perjury, if the oath was taken falsely, 
and no person could serve on the jury at a trial on such a charge, 
until he had himself taken the oath. With this bill Stevens was 
feeling his way, and testing the temper of Congress.
Within a week Stevens had offered a new and elaborate plan 
of reconstruction. This he called a substitute for the Restoration
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bill of the preceding session, hoping thereby to prevent Its being 
referred back to the Joint Committee. The bill provided that, 
while the Johnson governments were illegal, they would be recognized 
as valid for municipal purposes, until they could be altered in 
accordance with this bill. A convention was to be called, to 
draw Tip a new state constitution, which must be impartial, without 
regard to language, race, or former condition. The voters, and 
the members of the convention, were to be male citizens, 21 years 
of age, or over. Certain classes of former rebels were disquali­
fied. The state constitution was to be submitted to Congress, and 
if it was satisfactory, senators and representatives would be re­
ceived, and the state admitted to the Union. Amendments to the 
bill which were accepted after debate suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus, and placed the states under martial law.6 After much de­
bate, Bingham moved that the bill be recommitted to the Joint Com­
mittee, Stevens opposed this strenuously, but he was defeated,
7and the motion carried, 88 yeas, 65 nays, and 38 not voting. The 
committee spent two days in discussion of the bill, but the members 
were none of them very favorable to it* All of Stevens’ efforts 
to bring the i ssue to a vcte were evaded, end he was again de­
feated.^
In the meantime, George V. Julian, of Indiana, had offered to 
the House a solution for the problem. He believed that Congress 
was not yet ready to make an adequate plan of reconstruction, 
more time was needed to v/ork out details in a satisfactory manner. 
The best way would be to protect the southern loyalists, black and 
white, by establishing military governments in the South* Then 
Congress could take time to provide for the details necessary to
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establish permanent civil governments*
Taking the cue from Julian, Senator williams, of Oregon, on 
February 4* 1S67, introduced a bill providing for the establishment 
of military governments.10 This bill was discussed in the Joint 
Committee on February 6, and became the basis for the Reconstruc­
tion Act of larch 2, 1867.
The Committee incorporated some changes in the bill, all but 
one unimportant. The ••illiams Bill had provided for a military 
commander for each state; the committee divided the whole South 
Into five military districts. Conkling was responsible for the 
changes made, Bingham and Keverdy Johnson stood almost alone in 
opposition* Bingham proposed six different amendments, all of 
which were refused by every member but Johnson.^ This was the 
last meeting of the Joint Committee at which business was trans­
acted.
The bill, as reported, may be summarized briefly.
1. The South was divided into five military districts*
Virginia was to constitute the first district; North 
Carolina and South Carolina the second district;
Georgia, Alabama and Florida the third district;
Mississippi and Arkansas the fourth district; and 
Louisiana and, Texas the fifth district.
2. The General of the Army was to assign an officer 
to the command of each district, and provide for a 
sufficient military force.
3. Civil tribunals might be used, but military judg?aent 
was permitted^ exercised through military commis­sioners. Military trials were to be held when the 
commanding officer judged them necessary. The acts 
of commissioners must be approved by the commanding 
officer, in cases involving life or death.
No writs of habeas corpus might be Issued against
proceedings or judgments of the commissioners.124.
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Stevens presented the M i l  to the House on February 6, 1867.
He was very anxious to have it passed at once, as "any unnecessary 
delay must be fatal to the bill** He thought that one day would 
be plenty of time, and endeavored to block all demands for more 
time, for debate and study* He pointed out that there were only 
fifteen days of the session left* "We are not at liberty to in­
dulge our friends on the other side by adjourning the action of 
the bill. * . » Tomorrow, God willing, I will demand the vote. 
Nevertheless, he was not able to get the vote on that day. Debate 
continued for a week, during which time there were many amendments 
proposed. Only one of these is important, that offered by Blaine, 
on February 12. It added the provision that, if the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be accepted by three-fourths of the states then 
in the Onion, it should be considered adopted. Southern states 
might then be admitted as soon as they accepted the amendment.^ 
Naturally enough, the extreme Radicals opposed the Blaine amend­
ment. Some eighty-five of the more conservative Republicans sup­
ported it. The stupidity of the Democrats killed it. They thought 
that if they srevented any amendments, the whole bill would fall, 
and so they alligned themselves with the Radicals, in opposition 
to the conservative Republicans. In a preliminary division on a
motion to recommit, the vote stood 85 Republicans to 78 Radicals 
15and Democrats. There v/ere enough conservative Republicans to 
defeat the Radical-Democrat combination, and it appeared that the 
Blaine amendment would be adopted,
Stevens saved the day for the Radicals, by making a very 
powerful speech, which "may be placed as one of the few ever 
delivered in Congress that have resulted in the changing of
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v o t e s * T h e  speech was simply an appeal of the usual Radical
sort, but it had such far reaching effects that a brief summary of
it is not out of place. Stevens began by deploring the fact that
Congress had been sitting idle vdiile the South had been bleeding
at every pore'. He regretted that nothing had been clone before,
but felt that the delay was not the fault of the Joint Committee,
nor of himself. He had previously offered a bill vhich had been
defiantly refused. This bill had been received in the same spirit*
Gentlemen objected to its particles and its articles, but did not
make fundamental objections. They tried to amend, it in such a way
as to pledge future Congresses to admit the South on the basis of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This was simply a proposed step toward
universal amnesty and universal Andy-Johnsonisra. He appealed for
action. The deeds of this burning crisis would cast their shadows
far Into the future, and the members of the Thirty-ninth Congress
would appear upon the bright pages of history just in so far as
they gave their aid to promote the great cause of humanity and
universal liberty. Some gentlemen objected to the bill, favoring
Athenian or Galilean forgiveness and mercy* Yet those doctrines
apply only to private offenses, and not to political crimes.
Those who paliate the conduct of rebel traitors, whose hands are
red and whose garments are dripping with the blood of their
murdered kinsmen, are covering themselves with indelible stains,17which all the waters of the Nile can not wash out.
As a direct result of this speech, sixteen conservative 
Republicans changed their votes* On the final vote to recommit, 
the division was 69 yeas, (conservative Republicans) to 94 nays, 
(Radicals, Lomocrats and the sixteen conservatives.)'10
The bill passed the house, without amendment, by a vote of 
109 to 55. Stevens* comment, when the vote was announced, was 
n,Heaven rules as yet, and there are Gods above,tw
The bill was introduced into the Senate on February 13, by 
Williams, who announced that he intended to add the amendment 
offered in the House by Blaine, But the next day he withdrew his 
offer, after having "consulted with persons who know and advise 
me, . . .  I deem it my duty under the circumstances, to oppose all 
amendments to this bill. But a number of the Senators would 
not accept the bill without the amendment. Two days of debate led 
to a party caucus, on February 16, which reported very late that 
night, with a substitute bill, 'which combined the Reconstruction 
bill and the Blaine amendment, with one change in each. The 
President, instead of the general of the- army, was to appoint the 
military commanders in the districts, and the Southern states must 
modify their constitutions to provide for universal suffrage.
After an all night session, the Sherman substitute passed in the
Oftmorning of the eighteenth, by a vote of 29 to 10,
Two days later the Sherman substitute was refused by the 
House, when the Democrats again voted with the Radicals, But the 
Senate refused to abandon the substitute, and the House decided 
to accept it with two additional provisions. Ho person who would 
have been excluded from holding office by the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, could serve as a member of a state Constitu­
tional convention, nor vote for its members. Until the southern 
states should be admitted to Congress, their governments were to 
be considered as provisional only. The Senate accepted the House 
provisions by a. vote of 35 to 7.
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The bill was sent to President Johnson, who returned it with
a veto on March 2. It passed over the veto, the same day, in
both the Senate and the House, and in both chambers the majority
supporting the bill against the Presidents veto was larger than
22the majority passing the bill at first. However, it must not 
be supposed that this increase was due entirely to opposition to 
President Johnson, A number of Democrats and the more conservative 
Republicans, led by Reverdy Johnson, voted to override the veto, 
in order to get this bill passed during the Thirty-ninth Congress. 
It was known that the Fortieth Congress would be much more Radical 
than the Thirty-ninth, and these men wished to accept this bill, 
to prevent the next Congress from passing one even more objec­
tionable.
An outline summary of the progress of the bill follows.
THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT. 1867.
Hguse. February 6. Bill reported by Stevens.
February 12. Blaine Amendment proposed.
February 13. Bill passed, without amendment. 
109 yeas, 55 nays.
&&&££* February 13. Bill introduced by Williams.
February 16. Republican caucus agreed on Sherman 
Substitute.
February 17. Sherman Substitute accepted, 29 yeas, 
10 nays.
g2.ug.e- February 19. Sherman Substitute refused. 73 yeas, 98 nays.
February 19. Sherman Substitute Insisted upon.
Hous.e.. February 19. Sherman Substitute accepted with additional 
provisions. 126 yeas, 46 nays.
' —■ ■ ■"        1 1 ' ■     ---- ■ ■ '   ■ ^
Senate. February 20. House provisions accepted. 35 yeas, 7 nays
Presidential veto. March 2.
House. March 2. Passed over veto. 135 yeas, 48 nays.
Senate. March 2. Passed over veto. 38 yeas, 10 nays.
98.
Iterate m  £LU-
i>m»3gFl1fefi a£ £k<-U,fia-lg, with the Conservative Rebuttal.
£a£lfia3i Argument. The South is conquered terri­
tory. She resorted to arms, and was not victorious.
Conservative Rebuttal. The last war was not one of 
conquest, but was fought to enforce lav/ and preserve 
the Union. There was no subjugation about it.2^
Radical Constructive Argument. The har3h provisions of the 
bill are justified by the laws of nations relating to conquered 
provinces. According to the law of nations, a conquered state is 
subject to the wishes and dictates of her conqueror. It is 
clearly the right of the victorious government to decide what to 
do with the South, and Congress is justified in holding the van­
quished belligerent in the grasp of war until all the issues in­
volved in the war have been secured.
Conservative Rebuttal. V.lien tv/o nations fight, there 
may be conquest of nev/ territory. But here the North did 
not gain anything that had not already been held. She did 
not conquer a single inch of territory. It would be im­
possible for the Federal government to conquer her own
o /territory.
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SflasIgHfiU ’gfi I’he army must precede civil
government in the South, to pave the way, and protect the civil 
authority. The South must be kept in check with the bayonet and 
the sword until civil government can be safely established.
Conservative Rebuttal. The army should precede civil 
government only Then there is 3oae obstacle to civil 
government which is not to be overcome by any other means. 
There is no such obstacle in the South at the present 
time. Tiie only proper function of the military in the 
South is to enforce the laws and the v/ill of the civil 
government. It is true that the South is in a state of 
more or less disorder. But when Kansas was in a similar 
condition no military regime was established there.
Neither is it necessary now in the South.
Acflaasnfca &  aa£ itei&tsfl Jsz Sraaamfalvea*
The President has no power to reconstruct the South. That 
belongs with Congress. Only Congress can express the will of the
people, and viien the President trys to follow his plan he sets 
himself in opposition to the will of the people. The governments 
which the President has set up in the South are illegal, not only 
because the Executive has no legal right to establish them, but 
because they are not republican in form or purpose. There are no 
states In the South; there are only pretended states, the instru­
ments of power in the hands of a usurper. These governments must 
be repudiated, and set aside.^
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The Federal government has proved that is impossible to 
reconstruct the South by co-operating with her people. Since they 
refuse to co-operate in rebuilding what they have destroyed, 
Congress must remove the rubbish and build from the bottom. They 
refused the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis of reconstruction, 
and flung it back in our teeth with contempt and scorn. We have 
made a generous and magnanimous offer. It was not accepted, and
07now it is our turn to act.
Throughout the whole region of the states reconstructed by 
the Executive the principles of the rebellion are as thoroughly 
in possession of the country as they have ever been. The rebel­
lion is alive, and strong, and is manifested in defiance to the 
authority of the United States, The South is disorganized; it is 
despotic, Freedmen and loyalists are not safe in the possession
of their property* Their lives are endangered. Cruelty and
28oppression are common* These are proven facts.
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Congress must do its duty for the loyal people in the South. 
For two years persecution, exile, and murder have been the order 
of the day. These loyal men must be protected from the cruelties 
of anarchy, from persecutions by the malignant, and from vengeance 
visited upon them on our account. To discard them, now that the 
war is over, is a great evil, and one of the greatest crimes of
DOthe age.
If Congress does not advance some plan of reconstruction, 
the rebel South will. Already the rebel leaders are dictating 
terms to the government* If we adopt no practical plan for re­
construction, we shall have to accept terms at their hands. ®e 
must not submit to enter into treaty as equals with those who 
brought on the v/ar.
The people of the North demand Just such a plan of reconstruc­
tion. The people insist that this question be settled, and by 
their own representatives. At the last election, the people, 
having heard the stories of Southern refugees, told us that they
demanded protection for them. We promised to give it, and were
31elected on that promise. Yet we have done nothing.
Agaaasa&a &£ JSm .Saa^m ^yes, wi£h t&e fta£to.i iiaMfctai-
OftBaeffyatfrY? C2.q&fcSasA&g A^gumgn^. The bill Is unconstitu­
tional, as It is a war measure passed In time of peace. The 
Constitution permits martial law only in cases of insurrection 
or invasion. There certainly is no invasion. Insurrection does 
not exist in the South, except in some isolated districts. This 
bill places the whole country under martial law,
£M1S,§1 The country is still, for all
practical purposes, in a state of war. There are two 
states of war, ila^gafit, and peasants. The later 
condition is now upon the country# The bill is not 
unconstitutional, although it is a war measure, It 
Is a now article of war, commanding the array to return 
to its work of putting down the rebellion. It begins 
where Grant left off, and holds those revolted com­
munities in the grasp of war, until the rebellion 
shall have laid down its spirit, as it has already 
laid down its arms. Bayonet and sword are the only 
effective weapons we can send South, and the living 
spirit of the rebellion Justifies us in the use of a 
war measure.
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gon?,ery,atto Constructive Argument. The bill is unconstitu­
tional, as Congress Is not justified in establishing a suspension 
of the writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution provides that the
writ can not be suspended except In case of Invasion, that Is, 
flagrant war. There now exists no such emergency as to make this 
action necessary.
Radical Rebuttal. The rebellion has been crushed 
by war, but it is still sufficiently strong to over­
throw and defy the courts. If the courts were open 
everywhere for redress of violence, then we should 
not be justified in suspending the writ. But this 
Is not the case. The bill assumes that the country 
is in a condition which makes such action necessary.
The courts in the South are not really entitled to 
enjoy the privilege of the writ, anyway. Only 
legitimate and recognized governments have such a 
privilege.-^
mm nw, nwniw» ww» —
fiQBasrasj&ta S^JaasflLXg M m u m &• The bill is unconstitu­
tional, as it takes the President1s power as commander-in-chief 
of the army and navy. The President, and not the General of the 
Array, ought to have the power to appoint the commanders of each 
district. The President has supreme command of the army, and 
Congress can not, under the Constitution, assume to command it. 
IMjgjai Ma&fcSl* Congress does have the power to 
order and direct the army and navy. It has often been 
done by legislation. For instance, the Act of 1807, 
which ordered vessels to the coast survey, and the Act 
of 1832, which also detailed forces for the coast 
survey. The President is commander-in-chief of the
103.
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armies and navies of the United States, but the 
armies and navies are made instruments of the govern­
ment for the execution of the law. It is the business 
of the government to make laws, and the President must 
execute them. Although the President is comtaander-in- 
chief, Congress is his commander, and he must obey.^
SattSfim t a J Efi QaBSiamtaYfi The bill makes no pro­
vision for doing away with military rulers, and establishing civil 
government. Such harsh bills are always called temporary, when 
they are first promoted. And even if the next Congress wishes to 
repeal the bill, a mere majority in one house, or an unfavorable 
President, could prevent it. Besides, it is not safe to trust 
any group of human beings with so much power, and then expect 
them to surrender it. The bill Itself must place its limit.
Radical Bebuttal. The measure is intended to be of 
brief duration, and will, of course, be repealed when 
the time comes. So one contemplates that this bill 
will be a permanent measure. It is of a temporary 
character, and is demanded by present exigencies.
When those are removed, this measure will be abro-
35gated and abandoned,
fiaaagagaLU.Y.S P.flaa.frnw.U 'gg Argument. The bill is at war with 
the principles of free government. One-third of our people and
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state3 are arbitrarily put under military government. This bill 
inaugurates enough to destroy any government ever founded*
Radical Rebuttal. The bill is simply a police bill, 
which is necessary if the government is to be preserved. 
It has been made necessary by the wrong kind of recon­
struction being promoted in the South. This bill is not 
a reconstruction bill at all. It is simply a police 
bill, ’«hieh will protect the loyalists, and hold the 
South for the Union, until Congress can perfect suitable 
measures of reconstruction.^
s£ fiflqftm&t&aaa* m l  Itefatsa Sz £ &
The bill is unconstitutional, because it gives absolute 
power to a military ruler. The commanders in the five districts 
have complete, absolute, unrestricted power to administer the 
affairs of those states according to their own caprice and will. 
Such military despotism is at variance with the principles of
yjour government.
The court system set up by the bill is not Constitutional.
It denies the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
jury, to be informed of the nature of the charge, to be confronted 
with witnesses, to have compulsory process for obtaining wit­
nesses, to have the assistance of council. This bill simply
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provides for a court martial. It is opposed to the unanimous
decision of the Supreme Court, which judged, in the Milligan Case
that 'military courts do not have authority where civil courts are
38established, or over citizens not in the army or navy.
The bill extends too far, and is dangerous because of Its 
great breadth. There are portions of the South where it is not 
needed at all* All parts of the South have some loyal persons, 
and tills bill affects them with the same harshness and severity 
it affects the rebels. There should be some provision for flexi­
bility.39
The best interests of the country are being destroyed for 
party considerations, and for special and particular interests. 
Radical politicians do not want a complete and final reconstruc­
tion. They proposed the Fourteenth Amendment as a plan of re­
construction, but it was not really intended to be one. Many 
members of Congress are very anxious to prevent the Southern 
States from being reconstructed, because then their representa­
tives will have to be admitted, and the present majority will 
lose its power* Their plan Is to prevent their opponents from 
voting, and so carry their measures.4°
SM. Vfite L^asiaasa*
In his annual messages President Johnson had always discussed 
reconstruction, but he had approached the subject, not as a ques­
tion to be debated, but as a problem on which he had taken action. 
He stated simply what had been done, and gave almost no clew as 
to what he thought of the plans of the Radicals. Of course, in 
his messages when he vetoed the Freedraen1 s Bureau Bill and the 
Civil Rifcts Bill, he gave some revelation of his stand on Radical 
reconstruction. But it is in his message of March 2, 1867, 
vetoing the Reconstruction Act, that he shows his position most 
clearly. He believed that conditions in the South were satis­
factory, and charged the Radicals with forming their policy to 
promote party interests.^*
For the most part, his specific objections to the bill were 
those which had been already advanced in Congress. He felt that 
the bill violated the principles of American liberty, by placing 
all the people of ten states under absolute military domination, 
Tiie only justification for such action must be that there was no 
protection for life or property, and this was not the case. The 
power of the commanding officers was that of absolute monarchs, 
and history has shown that it has never been safe to trust un­
restrained authority to any class of men. Ihe bill was not 
Constitutional. First; the Constitution does not sanction 
vassalege, even in extreme cases where it has been necessary to 
resort to armed force. Second; the Constitution forbids the 
exercise of judicial power except by the ordained and established 
courts, and it expressly provides for trial by jury. Third;
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the United States is bound to provide each state with a republican 
form of government. Fourth; bills of attainder are expressly 
forbidden by the Constitution, yet here is a bill of attainder 
against nine million people. Fifth; the Federal government has 
no right to Interfere with the provisions of any state concerning 
its franchise* He pointed out that if the Southern governments 
were illegal, then the Thirteenth Amendment was not a part of the 
Constitution, since it had been passed upon by the southern states. 
He believed that to pass this bill would seem to bear out the 
claim of Southerners that they had been fighting for their liberty. 
They would become heroes. Of course, the war had really been 
fought to preserve the Union, and not to prevent Southerners 
from gaining liberty. Congress had formally declared, in July, 
1861, that the preservation of the Union was the object of the 
•war* T!iis bill would repudiate that declaration, and would 
constitute a breech of plighted honor*
With the passing of the Reconstruction Act over the Presi­
dents veto on March 2, 1867, the Radical party reached the peak 
of its power* It was supported by the great majority of people 
in the North, it was in absolute control of Congress, it was in 
a position to dictate government policies, and it stood on the 
threshold of absolute, despotic control of a third of the country 
and its people*
All this had been achieved In less than two years time* In
December, 1855, the party had no organized existence# Four months 
later it had attained sufficient support in Congress to override 
a Presidential veto. By the fall of 1866 the group was strong 
enough to sweep the national election. And in March, 1867, it 
had the force to put through Congress, over the President1s veto, 
a bill which was patently unconstitutional, which was cruel and 
unjust to a third of the people of the country, and whose only 
recommendation was party expediency.
Such a meteoric rise would have been impossible, but for 
throe thing, leadership, party cohesion, and a happy choice of 
party principle. The Conservatives were poorly led, and had few 
men of ability in their ranks# Against them the Radicals set up 
their efficient organization and their astute leadership. At the 
beginning of the first session their politicians, men of skill and 
experience, lapped out the chief features of their program, and 
decided on the methods of attack. They carefully drew up their 
plans, which went through unchecked, they secured the Joint 
Committee at once, and were assured that they would have time to 
perfect their own program without interference from the President* s 
plan already functioning, or from the delegates from the South who 
were clamoring for admittance into Congress. They were able to 
force an open break between Congress and the President, and so 
made their own plan of opposition to the President considerably 
easier. To the leaders of the party belongs this early success.
The party had still too few members to carry such a program by 
weight of numbers. But by adroit political manipulation, skillful
playing off of interests, and shrewd use of parliamentary tech­
nicalities, a very successful beginning was made.
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The South was the chief concern of Congress in 1866, and 
reconstruction v;as the natural thing for the Radicals to stress. 
But thoir stand on it was remarkably fortunate, from their point 
of view* It is very doubtful whether they ever could have swept 
to their great success on any other program* Their reconstruction 
policy coincided v/ith the war bitterness remaining in the North, 
it was admirably adapted to propaganda, it made fine material for 
emotional appeal* It was a vote-getter* But even reconstruc­
tion, unsupported, could never have made the party whet it became* 
It remained for the party leaders to promote their program, and 
present it to the public. This promotion was the chief cause of 
the Radical success. Probably no political party has ever been 
more successful in its advertising, or used more subtly clever 
means for furthering its ends*
The one word, propaganda, covers the whole policy of the 
Radical p-trty, but it tells nothing of the scope of the effort.
Men in high places gave interviews colored by Radical sympathy; 
government officers sent reports substantiating the Radical state­
ments; unknown persons flooded the North with letters bearing out 
Radical contentions; unsuspecting citizens repeated shocking 
stories put in circulation by the party pro3s; and unscrupulous 
politicians falsified reports to gain favor with the party. The 
Radicals used them all. They carefully built up an elaborate 
fabrication of lies and mls-representation, and covered their 
work cautiously, so as to make it all seem spontaneous and true.
By these under-cover methods the party gained wide, almost uni­
versal, credanee for their falsehoods, and were able to use them 
as a most effective background for their debate.
Because of this peculiar situation, the debates on the Re­
construction act introduced in February, 1867, differ from the 
debates on almost any subject ever brought up in Congress. Usually 
debaters offer proof for what they say. Here the Radicals simply 
made statements without any effort to substantiate them* They 
could rely on their previous work to support them. There was no 
debate, in the usual sense of the iford* There were only kindling 
language, and emotional appeal. They simply pointed to their 
elaborate structure of propaganda and appealed for support. The 
key to the whole Radical position was expressed by Hotchkiss, 
when he said nI need not appeal to facts to substantiate what I 
say* They are patent; every child that reads knows that what X 
say is true.” So wide-spread had been the Radical propaganda 
that every voter that read thought that what he said was true.
Out of these debates grew a government policy which shaped 
the whole future of the South. The country was plunged into a 
labor problem which immeasurably retarded her economic develop­
ment. Her government became chaotic* A bitter race war developed, 
Inevitably, and this conflict still exists in the South, and 
continues to produce grave evils, political and social. The 
reconstruction question was one of the most important that ever 
faced an American Congress. It is regrettable that the issue 
was settled on a basis of party expediency, rather than with 
regard to the future welfare of the nation.
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